Alex Stamos is the director of the Stanford Internet Observatory and the former chief information security officer of Yahoo and Facebook.

The details are still trickling in, but it seems possible that the latest Russian cyberattacks against the Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury and State; the National Institutes of Health; and possibly dozens of companies and departments will turn out to be one of the most important hacking campaigns in history.

The current reporting suggests that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), long considered Russia’s most advanced intelligence agency in cyber operations, managed to compromise the servers of an important vendor of information technology software and implant a back door. This company, SolarWinds, services tens of thousands of corporate and government clients, and its products naturally have access to critical systems. Since March, we’ve now learned, the SVR has been able to use this toehold to jump into the networks of a variety of highly sensitive organizations. I expect the true impact of the overall campaign won’t be known for months or years as thousands of companies scramble to determine whether they were breached and what was stolen.

While we don’t have all the details, it is already clear that something is wrong with how our country protects itself against the hackers working for our adversaries in Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. As the Biden administration puts together its plan to secure the United States against these kinds of attacks, and Congress considers how to update the existing bipartisan cybersecurity consensus, I offer three initial fixes.

First, we need to build a cyberspace equivalent of the National Transportation Safety Board. Such an agency would track attacks, conduct investigations into the root causes of vulnerabilities and issue recommendations on how to prevent them in the future. As things stand now, our only public account of this latest attack will come from the class-action lawsuits filed by lawyers acting on behalf of affected companies and shareholders. When I worked for Yahoo, I saw myself what happened after the company was attacked by the Russians. Legal teams produced dozens of depositions and reviewed hundreds of thousands of documents; then they collected their million-dollar payouts, and that was that. No public documentation resulted; no useful lessons were learned.

We should create a mechanism to handle cyberattacks the same way we react to serious failures in other complex industries; the NTSB offers a useful model. While voluntary transparency from technology companies such as FireEye has been helpful, it won’t provide the kinds of detailed reporting across dozens of victims that will enable other security teams to learn from this attack and thereby make the SVR’s job a bit harder.

And while we’re at it, let’s make sure Congress passes a federal data breach law that covers the thousands of secret breaches that occur every year but aren’t publicly discussed. Such attacks have included attempts to acquire critical vaccine data, rocket designs or trade secrets. But there’s no law requiring that they be disclosed unless they include the credit card numbers, email addresses and other bits of personal information covered by state breach laws. Our society can’t respond to the overall risk as long as we’re discussing only a fraction of the significant security failures.

Second, Congress and the new administration can work together to put defensive cybersecurity on the same level as offensive cyber operations and intelligence gathering. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was created only two years ago to coordinate defending both the public and private sectors. While CISA quickly established itself under director Chris Krebs, who was fired by President Trump for his truthful statements regarding election security, the size and technical competence of the agency does not yet match up to that of its offensive cousins.

CISA has about 2,200 employees spread across its cyber and infrastructure responsibilities. By comparison, the National Security Agency, only one of 17 members of the U.S. intelligence community, has more than 40,000. Patching routers at the Interior Department isn’t as sexy as destroying Iranian centrifuges or reading the correspondence of the Chinese Communist Party, but it is certainly just as important when you consider that the United States has the largest, most technologically advanced, and therefore most vulnerable, economy in the world.

Third, the Biden administration can appoint individuals with practical, hands-on defensive experience to key roles in the White House and critical agencies. Official Washington has long disrespected cybersecurity expertise in a way that would be unthinkable in other complex professions. The Senate would never confirm a malpractice attorney to be a surgeon general, and the president would never ask a Judge Advocate General Corps officer to serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But this, in effect, is just how Washington has treated cybersecurity — as something best understood by the lawyers who prosecute cybercrime and defend breached companies. This isn’t to dismiss the contributions made by members of the legal profession; there are many smart, dedicated lawyers working in the cybersecurity field. Even so, the Biden cybersecurity team should include the voices of people who have real experience preventing, detecting and responding to crises like the one our country is facing today. It’s long overdue that we started treating cyberthreats with the seriousness they deserve.

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