It is in this sense that the economy is “hot”; the comparable term in the 1960s and 1970s was the “high- pressure” economy. The theory is that only such an economy can force businesses to raise wages and hire marginal employees. Trump is shaping economic policy to realize this vision and, in the process, reap the political rewards of doing so.
There is only one large snag: We tried this in the ’60s and ’70s, and it failed abysmally. It led to double- digit inflation, frequent recessions and public demoralization. No matter. Trump is moving toward this sort of inflationary system by raising the economy’s demand and constricting its supply.
Here’s Trump’s check list.
First, pass a large tax cut financed by more borrowing. Check. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will reduce taxes by $1.5 trillion over a decade and be financed by larger deficits.
Second, increase government spending without, of course, offsetting extra demand with higher taxes (see above). Check. The recent budget plan is estimated to raise federal outlays by another $1.5 trillion over a decade.
Third, reduce government regulations, making it easier to begin new investment and construction projects. Check. This, too, would raise demand, though estimating how much is hard.
Fourth, limit competition from foreign workers and businesses by restricting immigration and imports. Check. From the border wall to rescinding Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, the administration has been anti-immigrant. Likewise, it has been protectionist; last week Trump announced new tariffs on steel and aluminum imports.
These various policies are familiar. What’s less familiar is their collective impact, which (again) is to stimulate demand and shrink supply.
Tight labor markets might well raise wage increases, and these in turn might stimulate higher price increases — and we are then off on a wage-price spiral reminiscent of the ’60s and ’70s. This, of course, won’t be the end of it.
The prospect of higher inflation means that “the Fed and the [Trump] administration are on a collision course,” as my colleague Sebastian Mallaby recently wrote in The Post. The Fed could respond to heightened inflation fears by raising interest rates more than is now expected. Or it could leave current plans unchanged on the hope that inflation won’t worsen. Either way, the economy and stock market could be vulnerable to a significant setback.
Running the economy “hot” is a superficially attractive policy. It promises to deliver the benefits of a strong economy to those who most need them. It suggests that we can enjoy the advantages of “full employment” on a more or less permanent basis. But like many appealing and visionary ideas, its utility breaks down in practice. It may make matters worse.
Traditionally, these policies have been most popular among the liberal left, because less-skilled workers seem to benefit the most. But, inevitably, there’s a backlash against higher inflation that — entailing higher interest rates and, often, recessions — hurts these very same workers. Though the process may be drawn out, it still takes its toll. Trump is either unaware of or indifferent to the contradictions.
At considerable social cost — fluctuating prices, widespread fears of the future — we learned these lessons in the 1970s. Surely we don’t have to learn them again.