A man kneels before an Orthodox priest in an area separating police and anti-government protestors near Dynamo Stadium on January 25, 2014 in Kiev. (Rob Stothard/Getty Images)

There are two competing stories about what’s happening in Ukraine. They’re both right. - The Washington Post

You may have noticed that there are two distinct ways that people tend to mostly talk and write about the three-month crisis in Ukraine. Experts and observers and journalists typically settle on one of those two narratives, use it to explain what's happening and then go on to talk about how the other version of events must therefore be wrong.

The two Ukraine storylines are indeed very different, they cast what's happening in very different lights, and people often argue about which one is right. But here's the thing: They can both be simultaneously true, and in fact there's a strong case to be made that they are. Here are those two narratives, how they explain events, who favors them and why they can both be true.

The human story: Angry citizens and a strongman president

Protesters hold shields as they clash with riot police during on-going anti-government protests in downtown Kiev. (EPA)

This is probably the version you're more familiar with. It portrays the crisis as pro-democracy, pro-European protesters challenging an increasingly corrupt and authoritarian government. This story is much easier to understand (that doesn't make it wrong, of course), particularly if you don't happen to have a lot of background knowledge about Ukraine, which most people don't. It conveys the crisis in human, relatable terms. This narrative is most favored by activists, both within Ukraine and abroad, and by Western conflict journalists covering the protests.

The story goes like this: In 2004, a Ukrainian politician named Viktor Yanukovych ran for president and "won" amid allegations of fraud, sparking international pressure to re-do the vote and wide protests – which became known as the "Orange Revolution." Yanukovych lost in the second round of voting. But he ran again in 2010, won, and has been increasingly seen as corrupt and with worrying authoritarian tendencies.

In November, Yanukovych surprised the world by rejecting a deal for greater integration with the European Union, instead accepting a $15 billion "bailout" from Russian President Vladimir Putin, with whom Yanukovych is quite friendly. Lots of Ukrainians in the west of the country, where he has less support, already saw him as corrupt and autocratic. They believed Yanukovych  had sold out their country to the Kremlin with the Russia deal, so they started protesting.

In mid-January, as demonstrations swelled, Yanukovych signed a set of "anti-protest" laws that severely restricted everything from free speech to the media. Activists called them "dictatorship laws," and not without reason. Protests grew again, including in the more pro-Russian east, and persisted even after the laws were mostly repealed.

Police crackdowns started getting really violent this week. Yanukovych, his popularity declining rapidly, looked more and more like an authoritarian mini-Putin, to Ukrainians and to the Western world. Members of his own party started bailing on him, with parliament voting to end the crackdown, which had clearly gone too far. He's on the brink of being brought down by his own abuses of power and by courageous Ukrainian protesters who have braved state violence and the threat of death.

It's an inspiring story, truly. And there is a great deal of truth to it. But there is also truth to the other predominant narrative.

The structural story: Demographics and an identity crisis

Ukraine's language divide. Data source: 2001 national census. (Laris Karklis/Washington Post)

This version of events is less exciting and more complicated, but it takes a much wider and more systematic view, which is probably why it's most often expressed by political scientists and analysts. Here's the idea: Ukraine has been divided by a national identity crisis since its 1991 independence. Partly this divide is demographic (see the map above), but it has much more to do with figuring out what kind of country Ukraine wants to be. Ukrainians themselves disagree on this; that disagreement has shaped their politics, up to and including this current crisis.

The story of Ukraine's national identity crisis has its roots in Russian conquests about 250 years ago. Russian rulers from Catherine the Great to Joseph Stalin wanted to "Russify" the eastern half of Ukraine, which is rich in natural resources and fertile farmland, by shipping in lots of ethnic Russians and passing laws to encourage people there to speak Russian  rather than Ukrainian.

The <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/30/9-questions-about-ukraine-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/">effect of all that Russifying</a> is that lots of Ukrainians speak Russian as their first language, particularly in the country's east, where people also tend to have fonder feelings for their historical and cultural links to Russia. In the mostly Ukrainian-speaking west, though, lots of people remember the brutality of Russian rule and they would much rather their country identify with Europe than with Russia. So the division is about much more than language.

This divide plays out in Ukrainian politics all the time. Every presidential election splits the country between a pro-Russian candidate, who wins lots of support in the east, and a pro-European candidate, who wins support in the west. Of course, the elections are about much more than this, and domestic issues play the biggest role. But the effect of the national-identity-crisis division is to divide elections along the same lines. You can see that in these maps:

Top left: Ukraine's Russian-speakers in blue. Top right: Major ethnic and linguistic groups. Bottom left: 2004 presidential election results. Bottom right: 2010 presidential results.

Yanukovych is from the east; Russian is his native language. When he was elected in 2010, it was largely by people in the more Russian-speaking, Russia-leaning east of the country. That divide came out again in November, when the current crisis began with Yanukovych rejecting the E.U. deal and instead taking Moscow's bailout. You may be surprised to learn that only about 43 percent of Ukrainians wanted the E.U. deal, <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/12/19/why-are-people-protesting-in-ukraine-providing-historical-context/">according to opinion polls</a>, which show 30 percent support for joining the Russian-led trade union instead.

So Yanukovych's decision against the E.U. deal did have a base of popular support, almost entirely among eastern Ukrainians who had voted him into office. In a way, it was a democratic decision, even if it was poorly executed. But it badly exacerbated that national identity crisis. It infuriated Ukrainians in the pro-European west of the country, who hadn't voted for Yanukovych in the first place. They weren't just protesting the president or his decision, though; they were protesting the Russia-leaning direction that he and his millions of Ukrainian  supporters wanted to take the country. (And yes, they were definitely protesting his well-earned record for corruption and strong-hand tactics as well.)

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">We should all be thankful the shooting has stopped in Kiev but the crisis isn't over, and won't be for a very long time
— Mark Adomanis (@MarkAdomanis) <a href="https://twitter.com/MarkAdomanis/statuses/436885049116733442">February 21, 2014</a></blockquote>

If and when the current crisis ends, it will not have actually resolved the deeper issue: a national identity crisis about whether Ukraine considers itself part of Europe or linked to Russia. This problem predated Yanukovych and his crackdown and it will still be there when he leaves, something that only Ukrainians can resolve as a nation.

These stories can both be true

People like clean, clear narratives, but the world is a messy and complicated place. No single theory or storyline is likely to explain something as big as a mass protest movement and political crisis.

The structural storyline, of an identity crisis fueled by history and demographics, appeals for its neatness and its comprehensive breadth. But it tends to rankle people, and not without reason, who see it as explaining away the bravery and idealism of the protesters, or forgiving the very real abuses of Yanukovych.

The more human narrative, of regular Ukrainians pushed to the breaking point by an abusive government they can no longer tolerate, is much more emotionally satisfying. Anyone can relate to it. It appeals especially to Americans, who feel an immediate affection for any pro-democracy movement, particularly one that expresses a desire to reject Russia and embrace the West. Still, this story ignores the 30 percent of Ukrainians who wanted to reject the E.U. deal for a Russia-led trade union, and it ignores the pro-Russia attitudes in the eastern half of the country. It almost seems to tell pro-Russia Ukrainians that they don't count, which can feel a bit Russophobic.

It's the relative weaknesses of the two narratives that make them so nicely complementary. One picks up where the other leaves off; one is compelling where the other is unpersuasive. When it comes to understanding something as complicated as Ukraine's political crisis, sometimes you need to be able to hold two competing ideas in your head at the same time to make sense of things.

Some home news: Today is my last day at The Washington Post, and this is likely my final post. I've had a blast launching and running <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/">WorldViews</a>, which now transitions to the capable hands of Adam Taylor and which you should keep reading. You can continue following me <a href="https://twitter.com/Max_Fisher">on Twitter</a>, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/max.fisher.3760">Facebook</a> and elsewhere.

I'll leave you with one last music break: the overture to Taras Bulba, an 1835 opera by the Ukrainian nationalist composer Mykola Lysenko. His life and work are wonderful metaphors for Ukraine's crisis, for <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/30/9-questions-about-ukraine-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/">reasons you can read about here</a>, and this overture is appropriately triumphant given <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/21/ukraines-parliament-may-have-just-saved-the-country-from-its-crisis/">today's positive developments</a> out of Kiev. Enjoy!

Max Fisher

The Washington Post

World

The Washington Post World section provides information and analysis of breaking world news stories. In addition to our world news and video, Post World News offers discussions and blogs on major international news and economic issues.

Deputies of the Ukrainian parliament applaud after voting for a constitution change in Kiev (GENYA SAVILOV/AFP/Getty Images)

Ukraine’s parliament may have just saved the country from its crisis - The Washington Post

Ukraine's parliament <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukraines-president-open-to-early-vote-polish-leader-says-scores-reported-killed-in-clashes/2014/02/21/05d3de46-9a82-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html?hpid=z1">has just approved a resolution</a> that allows for the release of Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister and opposition leader who has been in jail since 2011. Tymoshenko's arrest, ostensibly for a natural gas deal she signed with Russia while in office, is widely considered to have been political. She was a major rival to President Viktor Yanukovych and ran against him in the 2010 presidential election.

The parliament, which has 442 seats, approved the resolution by an impressive 310 votes, including dozens of lawmakers in Yanukovych's party. Technically, the vote does not directly call for Tymoshenko to be freed, but amends the country's criminal code in a way that seems likely to lead to her release.

Over the past 24 hours, Ukraine's parliament has passed a series of resolutions that aggressively undermine Yanukovych, curbing both his actual power and his legitimacy as national leader. This may actually be Ukraine's best shot at ending its three-month crisis and averting disaster. But it's an even bigger deal than that, because of what it means not just for Ukraine's present crisis but for its future as a fledgeling democracy.

Here are some other resolutions that parliament has passed in the last 24 hours: ordering security forces to pull back, amnesty for jailed protesters and firing the interior minister who led the crackdowns. These don't just call for an end to the crackdown, but take much of that authority away from the president entirely.

Ukraine's three-month crisis has pitted protesters and the European Union on one side vs. the Yanukovych government and Russia on the other. All sides had been escalating rhetoric and action. So the fact that parliament was able to step in and force a de-escalation was exactly what the country needed: a mediator who has the authority to impose a solution, and that has the legitimacy of a democratic, domestic institution. It had to be Ukrainians fixing this, not Russians or Western Europeans.

That the resolutions were supported by lawmakers from Yanukovych's own party help drive home their authority, which is awfully important, given how polarized the country can be by politics and demographics. This also dramatically undermines Yanukovych, in both fact and appearance.

That could help solve one of the biggest sticking points in the crisis: Protesters say they won't leave the streets until Yanukovych steps down, but he's hesitant to outright resign without at least holding elections first. But if the parliament can make him a lame duck and remove his authority and/or legitimacy, that could help satisfy protesters in a way that doesn't require Yanukovych to step down immediately.

Those are all reasons that these parliamentary resolutions have a great chance, along with <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukraines-president-open-to-early-vote-polish-leader-says-scores-reported-killed-in-clashes/2014/02/21/05d3de46-9a82-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html?hpid=z1">compromise deal signed today by Yanukovych and opposition leaders</a>, at helping to end this crisis peacefully. But that's not even the most impressive thing about them.

What makes this an even bigger deal is that, while foreign countries have played a role, it's ultimately Ukrainians pushing through a resolution, and doing it democratically. Most of the time, these sorts of crises end when one side is simply defeated outright, or cuts a middle-of-the-night deal brokered by foreign powers. But what's happening right now in Kiev is being driven by procedural, by-the-letter votes in the country's own parliament. In many ways, it's a victory not just for but by democracy and the rule of law.

And that's maybe the most amazing thing about Parliament so aggressively undermining Yanukovych — that they're doing it democratically, within the rule of law, following all the rules of procedure and form. That’s just extremely rare in "transitional" states in the long process of developing from an authoritarian to democratic system, particularly post-Soviet states. It’s a big deal and a really promising sign for Ukraine’s future, for its ability to adhere to democratic norms and institutions, which is really much easier said than done in transitional states.

To be clear, a lot of the forces that sparked the crisis  are still present. The economy is still a mess. Institutions are still weak and have reputations, not unearned, for corruption. Tymoshenko may be a martyr but she was not exactly a national savior while in office. And returning to the 2004 constitution is good, but the country was not in great shape in 2004 either. So Ukraine has not been transformed overnight into a perfectly functioning democracy, and it will likely face more such crises in the future.

The point is that Ukraine appears to have a way out of the crisis today. And with the parliament taking such a big lead, it may have even resolved things in a way that doesn't just ease today's crisis but makes the country and its government a little better equipped to handle the next one.

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych at the Olympics (David Goldman - Pool/Getty Images)

Ukraine’s parliament just threw President Yanukovych under the bus. That’s great news. - The Washington Post

Late Thursday, Ukraine's parliament voted to approve a resolution that calls for the country's security services to pull back and end their crackdown on ongoing protests. The resolution states an end to the "anti-terrorist" operation against protesters and orders a release of all imprisoned protesters, as well as similar measures.

The degree to which Ukraine's security services do or do not obey this resolution is not actually the most important thing here. What makes this a really big deal is that the parliament is actually as well as symbolically undermining President Viktor Yanukovych – challenging both his handling of the protests as well as the president himself. It's a very significantly symbolic blow to Yanukovych's legitimacy.

Here's why that matters: Yanukovych was democratically elected. Ukraine is what political scientists call a "transitional" government: It's not a fully entrenched democracy, and it's not autocratic, but it has features of both. The real danger with transitional governments is that they can revert to autocracy and authoritarianism pretty easily. That was a real risk in Ukraine in particular, especially after Yanukovych pushed through draconian "anti-protest" laws that limited free speech, assembly and media rights. Parliament pulled most of that law back, and now they're directly undercutting Yanukovych's institutional authority to crack down on protesters. And they're doing it though democratic processes.

That might not sound like it would matter so much, but it really does. It symbolically places Yanukovych, especially if he ignored parliament on this, outside of both the democratic processes and outside rule of law. He's stuck now – if he defies the resolution, he'll be basically labeling himself as anti-democratic, which will really badly weaken him institutionally.

This also goes a long way toward reducing the odds that Ukraine's military would intervene on Yanukovych's behalf, which was a serious concern. It reduces the odds of an outside Russian intervention as well, given how difficult it would be to maintain the fiction of intervening the protect Ukrainian democracy from "insurgents." (One caveat: It's not clear whether there were enough legislators present to meet a quorum, although some Ukraine-watchers <a href="http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-3-of-the-ukraine-crisis/">say</a> it was; 236 out of 442 seats.)

And it even delegitimizes Yanukovych within his own party. Of the lawmakers who voted for the resolution undercutting him, <a href="http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-3-of-the-ukraine-crisis/">34 were from his own party</a>. So it will be tougher for him to claim popular legitimacy even from his own political movement.

There was a time, early on in this three-month crisis, when Yanukovych could legitimately claim to have a popular mandate from his 2010 election and from the significant number of Ukrainians who supported his policies, including in rejecting the trade deal with the European Union, which had only about 42 percent support. But that's been getting tougher and tougher for him, and his own parliament just made it pretty close to official.

A screenshot from Espreso TV's live feed from Kiev on Tuesday, Feb. 18. (Espreso TV)

If Ukraine protesters are shooting back, that’s great news for the government - The Washington Post

A growing number of reports from Kiev <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/world/europe/ukraine.html?smid=tw-share&amp;_r=0">suggest</a> that some of Ukraine's protesters, after three months in Independence Square and several days enduring a brutal government crackdown, may have upgraded from molotov cocktails to firearms. Those reports are not conclusive, and they do not portray the protesters as picking up guns en masse. But the reports are coming in with enough frequency that it's worth giving some credence to the possibility that some protesters, after being shot at for days by police, are now shooting back.

You could hardly blame the besieged protesters if they wanted to fight firepower with firepower. Still, if this were to become a trend and protesters were to increasingly bear and use arms to defend against security forces, that could actually spell doom for their movement. It could be the best thing to happen to Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych since clashes reignited earlier this week.

When civil resistance movements popular uprisings adopt small arms use, they become much more likely to fail and the government becomes more likely to survive intact. That was a conclusion I reached, anyway, as part of my graduate research on government crackdowns against popular democratic movements. I surveyed 20 attempted uprisings over the past century and found overwhelming evidence that when protesters take up arms in large numbers they make their movement far likelier to fail. Within those cases, the chance that a popular uprising would "outlast" the government and ultimately secure its goals was cut almost in half if the protesters took up arms.

There a few reasons for this. One of them is that shooting back makes the conflict less about politics and more about simple force, a contest of strength that disorganized civilians are often bound to lose. Probably the biggest is the military: when protesters start shooting back at security services, it makes the military much more likely to intervene against them. And if the military intervenes against protesters, that usually ends things pretty quickly.

It's really, really difficult to overstate the importance of the military in moments of mass popular protest or uprising: ultimately, they have the monopoly on force, and they can decide the outcome if they want to. Militaries often try to stay out of this stuff, as appears to be happening now in Ukraine, where Yanukovych recently fired his army chief, which some speculate could be over disagreements about whether the military should intervene. But when protesters and police are shooting one another in the streets, the military becomes more likely to step in.

Partly this is about the generals feeling compelled to restore physical security. Partly, the protesters are legitimizing the use of deadly force, and eroding the taboo against open shooting, making it much easier for generals to ask their troops to open fire. And once that happens, once the protest-and-crackdown dynamic becomes a shooting match between protesters and troops, it's pretty much over because the military will outgun them almost every time. That's not to blame them the protesters, of course, but just to observe how this stuff happens.

When protesters take up arms, it also appears to often have an effect whereby the military doesn't just become more likely to intervene – the generals become more loyal to the government. There's a rally-around-the-flag effect. And the military becomes much less likely to lean on the government to make concessions.

Oftentimes, popular uprisings ultimately succeed because the military sides with them, explicitly or implicitly. We saw this in Romania in 1989, for example, when the military largely refused orders to put down protests, helping to doom leader Nicolae Ceaușescu. And we saw it in Egypt in 2011, when the military parked tanks around protesters to protect them from security forces, and shortly after forced out President Hosni Mubarak. But that becomes much less likely if protesters start using small arms. Militaries are just much less comfortable aiding a protest movement that shoots back.

To a lesser extent, when protesters take up arms it appears to ultimately reduce popular support for their movement. The hardcore coterie of activists might see the need for armed resistance, but most civilians tend to value their physical security highly, and are more likely to support the government if they believe the opposition is sowing violence. To shoot back is to risk alienating your own "quiet" supporters.

But the military is the big factor here. The protesters need the military to some extent, even if it's only for troops to stay in their barracks. If protesters take up arms, they're much less likely to have military support or even acquiescence. Worse, the military becomes more likely to intervene against them – and the rest of the population becomes more likely to support that. None of this is good for anyone, except perhaps Yanukovych.

Dramatic photos: Ukraine’s priests take an active role in protests - The Washington Post

Christianity has deep roots in Ukraine. The majority of Ukrainians are not actively religious, according to polls, but Eastern Orthodoxy is still a major force here. It's the faith that most observant Ukrainians follow, though they're divided between the Kiev and Moscow Patriarchates. (A number of Ukrainians also follow Greek Catholicism.) But churches and priests are omnipresent in the country, and especially so in the protests that have racked Kiev and other cities since late November.

Ukraine's Orthodox and Catholic priests have been frequently seen on or near the front lines of the clashes, ministering to protesters and riot police alike, though at times some have appeared to more closely align themselves near the protesters. Perhaps this is because protesters, camped out for three months in Kiev's Independence Square, and having endured the overwhelming firepower of security forces, are in more immediate physical need. Perhaps it's because of the complex historical relationship between church and state dating to Soviet-era Ukraine. Or maybe it's just where those priests' individual sympathies lie.

Whatever the case, photos tracking the priests as they move between both sides of the physical conflict, as well as minister to the dead and wounded, provide strikingly powerful glimpses into life on the ground in crisis-racked Ukraine.

Priests of different faiths pray a protests during clashes with police in central Kiev (AP Photo/Sergei Chuzavkov)

A man prays as people rest inside Mikhailovsky Zlatoverkhy Cathedral, which serves as a temporary shelter and a first-aid post for anti-government protesters, in Kiev. (REUTERS/Stringer)

A clergyman walks as people rest inside Mikhailovsky Zlatoverkhy Cathedral (REUTERS/David Mdzinarishvili)

A priest speaks through a megaphone to riot police and anti-government protesters at the site of recent clashes in Kiev (REUTERS/Konstantin Chernichkin)

A Ukrainian woman supporting president Viktor Yanukovich, and a priest speak to a police line, in Kiev (EPA/IGOR KOVALENKO)

A priest blesses anti-government activists (REUTERS/Gleb Garanich)

A priest marches with anti-government protesters (AFP PHOTO / ARIS MESSINIS)

A priest blesses an anti-government protester at a road block in Kiev (ARIS MESSINIS/AFP/Getty Images)

An Orthodox priest holds an icon as he stands in front of policemen in Kiev (SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP/Getty Images)

A Ukrainian priest walks at the site of clashes during another day of anti-government protest in Kiev (EPA/MAXIM SHIPENKOV)

A priest talks to Ukranian riot police (REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko)

A Ukrainian priest stands in front of a line of riot police as he takes part in a protest (EPA/ZURAB KURTSIKIDZE)

A Ukrainian church priest blesses a fighter during clashes with riot police (EPA/MAXIM SHIPENKOV)

An orthodox priest stands amidst Ukrainian protesters, outside the European Council building in Brussels (AP Photo/Yves Logghe)

A priest tends to a wounded anti-government protester in the lobby of the Hotel Ukraine (Photo by Brendan Hoffman/Getty Images)

A priest stands in the lobby of the hotel Ukraine (REUTERS/David Mdzinarishvili)

An Orthodox priest walks under fire during clashes between anti-government protesters and riot police (SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP/Getty Images)

A priest rushes to give the last sacraments to an anti-government protester during clashes with riot police in central Kiev (BULENT KILIC/AFP/Getty Images)

An Otrthodox priest gestures after clashes between anti-government protesters and riot police (REUTERS/Yannis Behrakis)

An Orthodox priest holds a cross as a woman reacts next to dead bodies following violence in Independence Square (REUTERS/Konstantin Chernichkin)

Could Ukraine’s crisis become a civil war? - The Washington Post

The possibility that Ukraine's crisis could spiral into civil war is getting more and more attention, and it's not hard to see why.

Update, Feb. 20: There are reports that some protesters may be taking up arms. If this trend continues, it may increase the odds that the military would intervene to disperse protests, but decrease the odds that the military would attempt a coup or would divide internally. Unfortunately, it also naturally increases the risk of a prolonged armed conflict, however minor. <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/20/if-ukraine-protesters-are-shooting-back-thats-great-news-for-the-government/">Read what this all means here</a>.

What's happened that has people so worried?

Increasingly deadly clashes between security forces and protesters have killed at least 25 since Tuesday. Everyone is escalating in action and rhetoric, and no one is showing much sign of backing down, which is only going to get harder to do.

The government <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/19/the-10-most-important-events-in-ukraine-since-protests-reignited/">appears bent on using crackdowns</a> to "end" the crisis (it's also warning it will <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/94692.aspx">launch "anti-terrorist" operations</a>), protesters are <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/kiev-explodes-into-chaos-at-least-25-reported-dead-in-ukraine-protests/2014/02/19/aacecc60-9967-11e3-b88d-f36c07223d88_story.html?hpid=z1">using molotov cocktails</a>, Moscow has <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4a362e60-8a68-11e3-ba54-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2rpyBMy00">labeled</a> the protests an "insurgency" and urged the government to disperse them, European leaders are threatening sanctions, protesters <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26255920">occupied government buildings</a> in the city of Lviv and may have <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/world/europe/ukraine.html?hpw&amp;rref=world&amp;_r=0">seized weapons</a> left by soldiers, the pro-Moscow regional government in Crimea says the protests have <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/crimean-lawmakers-urge-yanukovych-to-take-extraordinary-measures-to-settle-crisis-337068.html">become a "civil war,"</a> on and on.

Who's talking about a possible civil war breaking out?

Observers worried about the risk of civil war <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25939737">include</a> former Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk and the <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/02/19/ukraine-headed-civil-war-russian-mp">official spokesman</a> for Russia's foreign ministry. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-18/ukraine-fighting-leaves-at-least-18-dead-as-kiev-barricades-burn.html">warned</a>, “We may be witnessing the first hour of a civil war."

Alexei Vlasov, who as director of the Center for the Study of the Post-Soviet Space at Moscow State University is considered something of an expert, <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2014/0129/Amid-civil-war-talk-Kremlin-keeps-wary-eye-on-Ukraine-video">has warned</a>, "If the situation goes out of control there, it could lead to civil war." The headline of Newsweek's story from today declares simply, "<a href="http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-heading-civil-war-229494">Ukraine: Heading for Civil War</a>."

So: Is Ukraine really headed for civil war?

What follows are reasons for and against expecting that worst-case outcome. To be clear, anything could happen, predicting outcomes to complex events is notoriously difficult, and it's always possible that this will be decided by factors not currently visible. On net, though, the risk of civil war appears not impossibly low but very low. I explain why below.

How a civil war would happen

As a basic premise, let's stipulate that for Ukraine to become a civil war, the military would most likely have to get involved. So the question of what the army does, or doesn't do, is a really crucial one.

There are two ways for the military to get involved: either it is ordered to do so by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, most likely to stamp out protests; or it imposes itself, most likely in an attempted coup. In either case, the way that this becomes a civil war is that the military comes in seeking to stabilize the country, but things spiral out of control. Maybe its presence inflames a popular uprising, which it then fights, or the military divides over what to do and fights itself.

Keep in mind that starting a civil war would have to be a two-step process. First the military would have to get involved, either because Yanukovych asked it to step in or because it attempted a coup. Then something else bad – a popular uprising, a split in the military leadership – would have to force the military into widespread armed conflict.

Is Yanukovych going to bring in the military?

Yanukovych has been able to stick with civilian security forces for three months, but the violence is getting worse and the security services have failed to dislodge protesters. So it's possible Yanukovych is getting that desperate.

The government's talk about "anti-terrorist" operations doesn't bode well. And Yanukovych fired his army chief on Wednesday – an extremely bad sign. We don't know why he did it, but speculation has immediately turned to the possibility that the army chief had refused orders to bring the military out into Kiev's streets. If that's the case, then this is worrying both because it implies that Yanukovych may have been pushing for military involvement and because it hints at possible splits within the military leadership. All very bad signs.

The threat of European Union sanctions, already on the table because of the crackdown, makes it less likely that Ukraine might call in the military. But Yanukovych knows he is ultimately more reliant on Russia, which certainly seems open to all options in suppressing the demonstrations. So bringing in the military is not outside the realm of possibility.

Will the military attempt a coup or otherwise intervene on its own?

This seems much less likely. For all its problems, Ukraine is a democracy with a democratically elected government. Yanukovych's crackdown is certainly authoritarian in character, and he's passed some awfully draconian anti-protest laws (which were later rescinded), but there's no indication that the government is going to delay elections or shut down democratic norms entirely.

The next presidential election begins in exactly one year and one week. It seems unlikely that the military would stage a coup to remove Yanukovych, with all the risks that that entails, so soon before voters are probably going to do it anyway.

But rather than just speculate on narrative details, let's look at <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/28/a-worrying-map-of-the-countries-most-likely-to-have-a-coup-in-2014/">the preeminent annual study on the risks of coups</a>, which is run by political scientist Jay Ulfelder. Like all model-based forecasting tools, Ulfelder's is about estimating risk, not predicting the future. Still, it's a useful tool. His model predicts a 3.0 percent chance of a coup this year. That's pretty low! There are 49 countries with a higher estimated risk of a coup. Still, it's the most at-risk country in Europe. I asked Ulfelder to help me understand why Ukraine scored how it did. Here's his response:

European countries generally get very low forecasts because most of them are relatively rich (as indicated by low infant mortality rates) and have fairly or very long-standing democratic regimes with no recent history of coup activity. In the past 50 years, coups have almost never happened in countries like that.

Ukraine also has a relatively low infant mortality rate (in global terms) and no coup attempts in the recent past. What pushes its score up relative to the rest of Europe are its "mixed" political regime, the political salience of ethnicity, and its slow economic growth.

You might expect some of the other former Soviet republics with more repressive regimes to be at greater risk — places like Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan — but over the past 50 years, coups have occurred very rarely in durable dictatorships like those. It's the "transitional" cases that are generally more susceptible, and that's part of what the forecasts are capturing.

To be clear, by "transitional," Ulfelder means that the government "combines significant features of authoritarian rule and democracy." So it's not exactly American-style liberal democracy, but nor is it Russian-style autocracy, and that matters a lot for the risk of a coup.

Let's say the military gets involved. What are the odds that that leads to civil war?

So, let's focus on the scenario in which Yanukovych asks the military to step in, since that seems significantly more likely than a coup. Will the military succeed in imposing order, or will it fail and thus invite chaos and conflict?

As it happens, my master's thesis addressed this exact question: How can you tell when a military crackdown will succeed and when it will fail? I looked at a wide range of factors across 20 military crackdowns, from the French Revolution through the Arab Spring, and found that there are three factors that best predict the outcome of a military crackdown. Those factors are: troops are demographically distinct from protesters, the military has fought on domestic soil within the past generation, and the civilian government has strong political control over the military.

My research found that, if any one of those factors is present, the crackdown is likely to succeed. In Ukraine, two of them are present. The civilian government does have strong control over the military – the president just fired his military chief, after all. And Ukraine's demographic divide means that it would be hypothetically quite easy for the military to field troops from the country's Russian-speaking half to crack down on the protesters in the Ukrainian-speaking half.

And there are other factors here that tend to correlate with a successful crackdown, or at least that don't correlate with failure. That Yanukovych's most important ally, Russia, approves of a crackdown would make it more likely to go through. Surprisingly, some of the factors that you might expect to aid in the protesters' ability to resist crackdowns – a unified opposition, real democratic institutions – don't seem to have historically predicted outcomes one way or the other.

In other words, the research suggests that, if the Ukrainian military intervenes to put down the protests, it will probably be successful. Probably.

What about if the military divided against itself, though?

That does not tend to happen much. This would mean some number of senior military leaders "defecting," but right now it's not clear that they'd have anything to defect to. There is an outside risk here, given that the military likely reflects the country's demographic divide between Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers. But it's not very likely, particularly since it's hard to see how the military would come to face a crisis serious enough that generals would even have the opportunity to defect if they wanted to.

So what you're saying is that civil war is probably not going to happen.

Right. The most likely outcome is that the military stays out and that Ukraine's crisis, however dire it might become, will not lead to civil war. If the military does get involved, it will probably be to impose order on behalf of Yanukovych, which past case studies suggest would be successful and thus avert civil war.

The scenarios that would lead to civil war seem unlikely but not totally impossible. An attempted coup that leads to a civil war is not that likely since the data suggest that the military has perhaps a 3.0 percent chance of attempting a coup. A failed crackdown that leads to a popular armed uprising is not likely as any military crackdown will likely succeed. An internal military divide is not likely unless the military comes to face a massive internal crisis, which would require one of the above scenarios to happen, which as explained is not too likely.

Still, as remote as all these possible outcomes are, the risk is just real enough that everyone in Ukraine is going to be better off if this crisis is resolved democratic, pluralistically, peacefully and very soon.

The 10 most important events in Ukraine since protests reignited - The Washington Post

Three months after they first began in Kiev's Independence Square, Ukraine's protests reignited Tuesday, when opposition lawmakers failed to push through constitutional changes that would have limited the president's powers. The ensuing 24-plus hours have been by far the bloodiest since the crisis began, with at least 25 people, including several policemen, killed in increasingly violent clashes between protesters and security forces.

In case you're just tuning in, what follows are the most important events since security forces first moved in against the crowds. The main theme you may notice here is lots of escalation, in action and rhetoric, by forces within Ukraine and by the foreign powers backing the two "sides" in the crisis. The more they escalate, the tougher it will be for either to back down or reach a compromise.

(1) 'Ring of Fire': Protesters set up giant barricades around their protest camp, in and around Independence Square. They deconstructed their own tents and other supplies to burn as fuel in a "ring of fire" meant to keep out security forces. Demonstrators threw rocks and molotov cocktails.

(2) Security forces push in: Police appear to have cordoned off the area around the square to prevent more people from moving in. They've made several pushes into the protest camp; it's not clear what weapons they've used in addition to firehoses, but medical workers said that a number of protesters had died from gunshot wounds. Electricity to the square was cut off, but the stage that protesters have used as a focal point retained power through a generator.

(3) Police may have been burned alive: Estimates on the numbers of security forces killed vary, as do the explanations. The government says they were killed from gunshot wounds, though witnesses say they appear to have been burned alive in their armored vehicles.

(4) Opposition and Yanukovych meet, fruitlessly: Opposition leaders had to <a href="http://www.interpretermag.com/what-happened-overnight-in-kiev-and-throughout-ukraine/">wait several hours</a> to see Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych for negotiations, which did not produce any agreements.

(5) Government cites 'terrorism': The Ukrainian government <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/94692.aspx">announced</a> that it would launch "anti-terrorist" operations. It's not clear precisely what this means, but it's interpreted as an escalation of rhetoric meant to imply that some protesters are terrorists, and potentially to justify an even stronger government action.

(6) Protesters in western city seize government buildings: In Lviv, a regional capital in the country's heavily pro-European west, anti-government protesters seized a number of government administration buildings. These reportedly include a local army barracks. Video <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26255920">purports to show</a> local troops "surrendering" to the protests, although they may be local conscripts who share the protesters' views.

(7) Crimea regional government calls for escalation: In the southern region of Crimea, the only region of Ukraine where ethnic Russians outnumber ethnic Ukrainians, government officials said the situation had <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/crimean-lawmakers-urge-yanukovych-to-take-extraordinary-measures-to-settle-crisis-337068.html">become a civil war</a> and called for Yanukovych to escalate accordingly. Crimea's population and government are unusually pro-Moscow and thus more likely to back the Yanukovych government.

(8) Russia ups its rhetoric: The foreign ministry of Russia, which supports Yanukovych, denounced the protests as an attempted coup, "criminal activities" and a "brown revolution," an allusion to the rise of Nazi Germany. It said Russia would use "all our influence to restore peace and calm."

(9) Europe considers sanctions: European leaders tried to contact Yanukovych but were not answered. Poland and France called for targeted sanctions against Ukraine for the government's use of force. The European Union says it will meet to consider a response, though the EU is not exactly known for its decisiveness on such matters.

(10) Biden calls: U.S. Vice President Biden called Yanukovych to urge him to "pull back government forces and to exercise maximum restraint," according to a White House statement. Biden also "underscored the urgency of immediate dialogue with opposition leaders to address protesters’ legitimate grievances and to put forward serious proposals for political reform."

A screenshot, taken 9:45pm Kiev time, of Espreso TV's live feed from Kiev's protests. Watch the live feed here.

The 16 essential Twitter accounts to follow Ukraine’s unfolding crisis - The Washington Post

After almost three months of protests in Ukraine, violence reignited Tuesday when thousands of demonstrators tried to march from their camp in Independence Square to the Parliament building a mile away and were confronted by security forces. Clashes have become increasingly violent, with nine killed already, making it by far the deadliest day of Ukraine's crisis, and things appear to be getting rapidly worse.

<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/18/the-three-big-reasons-that-protests-reignited-in-ukraine/">Read why protests reignited here</a>. <a href="www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/30/9-questions-about-ukraine-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/">Read the fuller backstory on Ukraine's crisis here</a>. At this point, events are moving so quickly that Twitter may be one of the best ways to follow it. Here are 16 accounts you should follow to keep up with events (hat tip to BuzzFeed's Max Seddon for some of these).

(1) Christopher Miller – The editor of the English-language Kyiv Post is on the ground. He's also a practiced expert at translating and explaining Ukraine and its politics for an English-speaking audience. Essential.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">Protester tents burning on Maidan right now after police toss Molotov cocktails from their perch above square. <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23euromaidan&amp;src=hash">#euromaidan</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23ukraine&amp;src=hash">#ukraine</a>
— Christopher Miller (@ChristopherJM) <a href="https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/statuses/435839377361481729">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(2) Yulia Bragina – A Sky News producer who is usually in Moscow but now in Kiev.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">Arseniy Yatsenuk, one of the opposition leaders has called for truce till morning, but calls were ignored. Heavy smoke rising from maidan
— Yulia Bragina (@YuliaSkyNews) <a href="https://twitter.com/YuliaSkyNews/statuses/435852481348636672">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(3) Maria Danilova – The A.P. correspondent in Kiev. Speaks Russian. Not a frequent tweeter, but you want to catch it when she does.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">As riot police move in on opposition camp in Kiev, protesters sing Ukrainian national anthem <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23euromaidan&amp;src=hash">#euromaidan</a>
— Maria Danilova (@mashadanilova) <a href="https://twitter.com/mashadanilova/statuses/435842399038758913">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(4) Myroslava Petsa – Reporter with Ukraine's Channel Five.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en"><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23Yatsenyuk&amp;src=hash">#Yatsenyuk</a>: Don't cover <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23Ukraine&amp;src=hash">#Ukraine</a> with blood. Immediate truce is our demand, then we'll join negotiations.
— Myroslava Petsa (@myroslavapetsa) <a href="https://twitter.com/myroslavapetsa/statuses/435846790990929920">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(5) Nataliya Gumenyuk – Ukrainian freelance reporter.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">talking to AlJazeera English in a minute.it's indeed getting worse with every minute. no sense to crackdown,police goes on <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23maidan&amp;src=hash">#maidan</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23ukraine&amp;src=hash">#ukraine</a>
— Nataliya Gumenyuk (@ngumenyuk) <a href="https://twitter.com/ngumenyuk/statuses/435852045350752256">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(6) Leonid Ragozin – Former BBC, now travel writer

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">Crimean parliament says civil war is under way in Ukraine. States possibility of mobilization. <a href="http://t.co/3gJPfDw6ZB">http://t.co/3gJPfDw6ZB</a>
— Leonid Ragozin (@leonidragozin) <a href="https://twitter.com/leonidragozin/statuses/435856414276616193">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(7) Kateryna Kruk – The press secretary for an opposition lawmaker, Kruk has been tweeting from the heart of the protests <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/who-if-not-me-why-one-ukrainian-activist-is-protesting/282077/">since they began</a>. Invaluable.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">protesters have set water cannon on fire.
— Kateryna_Kruk (@Kateryna_Kruk) <a href="https://twitter.com/Kateryna_Kruk/statuses/435853418628788224">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(8) Lyalya Horsky – Frequent tweeter, photographer and livestreamer from Independence Square.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">A security ring has been formed around the center of <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23Kyiv&amp;src=hash">#Kyiv</a> impossible for anyone to get to the maidan from outside <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23euromaidan&amp;src=hash">#euromaidan</a>
— Lyalya Horsky (@lyalyaHorsky) <a href="https://twitter.com/lyalyaHorsky/statuses/435844635488190464">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(9) Taras Denysenko – A student and software developer.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en"><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23euromaidan&amp;src=hash">#euromaidan</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23Ukraine&amp;src=hash">#Ukraine</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/insider_com_ua">@insider_com_ua</a> reports that Lviv regional administration building is retaken by protesters.
— Taras Denysenko (@TarasDenysenko) <a href="https://twitter.com/TarasDenysenko/statuses/435859090162454528">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(10) Ukraine Pravda – An opposition newspaper. Rarely in English, but lots of photos and videos.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">На Майдані горять намети під стелою і намети з іншого боку Інститутської <a href="http://t.co/UfGcFkzPzl">pic.twitter.com/UfGcFkzPzl</a>
— Українська правда (@ukrpravda_news) <a href="https://twitter.com/ukrpravda_news/statuses/435848691929202688">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(11) EuroMaydan – A purportedly official account of the EuroMaiden protests (so named for the protest site, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, which means Independence Square, and for the pro-European mission). Rarely in English, still worth following for photos, videos and links.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en"><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23%D0%84%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%9C%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD&amp;src=hash">#ЄвроМайдан</a> зараз 21.20 <a href="https://t.co/WxThMEIMuf">pic.twitter.com/WxThMEIMuf</a> <a href="http://t.co/UKuMOHeboV">http://t.co/UKuMOHeboV</a>
— ЄвроМайдан (@EuroMaydan) <a href="https://twitter.com/EuroMaydan/statuses/435856594170281984">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(12) Max Seddon – BuzzFeed correspondent, typically in Kiev or Moscow. Briefly traveling. But, even abroad, an excellent aggregator with a sharp eye.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">Pro-Kremlin newspaper says dozens of buses of riot police massing outside Kiev, awaiting the command to storm Maidan <a href="http://t.co/1HHVpyQXXd">http://t.co/1HHVpyQXXd</a>
— max seddon (@maxseddon) <a href="https://twitter.com/maxseddon/statuses/435854988699369472">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(13) Natalia Antonova – A Moscow-based journalist, relaying information from her father, who is in Kiev.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">Dad saw heavy-duty vehicles on the way to Maidan. License plates not local. Buses - license plates not local. <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23Kiev&amp;src=hash">#Kiev</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23euromaidan&amp;src=hash">#euromaidan</a>
— Natalia Antonova (@NataliaAntonova) <a href="https://twitter.com/NataliaAntonova/statuses/435844414918119424">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(14) Simon Shuster – A Berlin-based journalist for Time magazine, previously in Moscow and currently Sochi.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">Ukraine protest leader, ex-Minister Lutsenko: "The slaves of Putin want to make us all slaves...We will lay down our lives for the freedom"
— Simon Shuster (@shustry) <a href="https://twitter.com/shustry/statuses/435855488278728704">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(15) The Interpreter – A Russian-to-English translation journal. Highly critical of the Kremlin.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en"><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23Ukraine&amp;src=hash">#Ukraine</a> Liveblog: The main Ukrainian TV channel reporting on protests has been shut off <a href="http://t.co/bugEFZ0z9D">http://t.co/bugEFZ0z9D</a>
— The Interpreter (@Interpreter_Mag) <a href="https://twitter.com/Interpreter_Mag/statuses/435856652995403776">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

(16) Hannah Thoburn – A research assistant at the Brookings Institution focusing on Ukraine and other post-Soviet states.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">Ukrainian riot police still broadcasting requests for women and kids to leave the square. More violence likely to come.
— Hannah Thoburn (@HannahThoburn) <a href="https://twitter.com/HannahThoburn/statuses/435841786515574784">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

WATCH: Live video feed shows the ongoing crackdown in Ukraine - The Washington Post

Independent Ukrainian news station Espreso TV is broadcasting live from the clashes in Kiev. Protests there reignited today (<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/18/the-three-big-reasons-that-protests-reignited-in-ukraine/">here's why</a>) as thousands of demonstrators tried to march the mile from their camp at Independence Square to the Parliament building. Security forces cracked down; the ensuing violence is thought to have <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukraine-protests-once-more-turn-violent-four-reported-dead/2014/02/18/ba9173f4-98af-11e3-80ac-63a8ba7f7942_story.html">killed nine people already</a>, and police are anticipated to make a big push soon.

The live video feed comes from two cameras trained directly on the clashes. It is stomach-churning to watch. Explosions are nearly constant, mostly from fireworks but also possibly from security forces and homemade explosives (they've been used before; an opposition site <a href="https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/435838832513019904">says</a> riot police are using molotov cocktails). There's a large fire on one end of the square and, on another, a phalanx of security forces shooting a water cannon at demonstrators. The temperature is just above freezing in Kiev.

<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/18/the-three-big-reasons-that-protests-reignited-in-ukraine/">Read the three big reasons that protests reignited here</a>. Read the fuller backstory on Ukraine's crisis here: <a href="www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/30/9-questions-about-ukraine-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/">9 questions about Ukraine you were too embarrassed to ask</a>.

A screenshot from Espreso TV's live feed from Kiev, taken about 8:30 p.m. local time.

Kiev is seven hours ahead of the U.S. East Coast, meaning that as it is 1:30 p.m. here, it is 8:30 p.m. there.

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">Based on what I see on live streams from Kyiv, I can only expect that this is going to be a very bloody night. Pray for Ukraine.
— Hannah Thoburn (@HannahThoburn) <a href="https://twitter.com/HannahThoburn/statuses/435835191920435200">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">MT <a href="https://twitter.com/Interpreter_Mag">@Interpreter_Mag</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23BREAKING&amp;src=hash">#BREAKING</a> - Police ask women and children to leave Maidan so they can begin an "anti-terrorist operation"
— Blogs of War (@BlogsofWar) <a href="https://twitter.com/BlogsofWar/statuses/435833437732081664">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">Ukraine govt seals off Kiev to prevent revolutionary reinforcements from entering the city, shuts down Kiev subway for similar reasons.
— Simon Shuster (@shustry) <a href="https://twitter.com/shustry/statuses/435837993589276672">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en"><a href="https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM">@ChristopherJM</a> yep, and people are being killed - on both sides of the barricades:(
— Malina (@MalinAlina3) <a href="https://twitter.com/MalinAlina3/statuses/435843220606418944">February 18, 2014</a></blockquote>

Members of China's People's Liberation Army march in Beijing in this 2005 photo. According to a new report, they've since gotten taller and wider. (FREDERIC J. BROWN/AFP/Getty Images)

Chinese soldiers are getting too big for their tanks - The Washington Post

The People's Liberation Army, one of the largest armed forces in the world, has released a study on the physical welfare of its thousands of troops. The study, <a href="http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2014-02/18/content_67646.htm">published in Chinese</a> in the army's official newspaper and <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/02/18/chinas-swelling-soldiers-too-big-for-tanks/?mod=WSJBlog">reported on</a> by the Wall Street Journal's Josh Chin, warned that Chinese soldiers have gotten too tall and fat for some of their equipment. Rifle butts are too short for their longer arms and, more comically, soldiers assigned to tank divisions are sometimes too big for the tanks.

This is a problem with which the U.S. military is all too familiar: The Pentagon has been warning for years that rising obesity in the U.S. is reducing the military's ability to field and deploy appropriately fit servicemembers.

But there's a big difference here: American troops are too big because they're unhealthily overweight. Chinese troops are too big because nutrition is better, particularly in childhood, and they're more healthily robust. The troops, the survey found, have an average waistline five centimeters (about two inches) larger than the average 20 years ago. But average height has increased by two centimeters. In other words, this is a good problem.

We in the U.S. are so familiar with China's rise that we often forget how recently it was much weaker and poorer. Malnutrition was widespread, particularly in rural communities, which meant that lower-class Chinese who went into the military were more likely to be underfed and underweight. So, as the Chinese military grew and modernized (which it had to do in large part by designing its own military technology because of trade sanctions), it designed its equipment around troops as they were. Now they've outgrown the old gear.

But China has got this: The PLA report says it's measuring troops on 28 different metrics to figure out how to redesign military equipment for the now-larger force.

What's interesting about comparing the Chinese and American militaries' struggles with larger troops is that both problems are functions of development. As China becomes less poor, its troops are less undernourished. But as countries go from middle-income to high-income, as the U.S. is, their populations also <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22305524">tend to become more obese</a>. The same economic growth that made Chinese soldiers healthier may also, if it continues, someday make them less healthy, as has happened in America. Maybe, in two or three generations, the PLA will have our problems.