The House of Representatives is investigating President Trump’s alleged efforts to pressure Ukraine’s government to dig up dirt on Joe Biden, one of Trump’s potential rivals in the 2020 presidential election. Research suggests that incumbent presidents generally have a modest advantage over their challengers in familiarity, fundraising and media coverage. But this is different. If these allegations are true, then Trump has been doing something that’s unusual in established democracies — but widespread in countries where the rule of law is weak, such as the post-Soviet region: using what political scientists call “administrative resources” — governmental power, or in this case, the powers of the presidency — to win elections.

These post-Soviet governments find many ways to disadvantage potential opponents.

Leaders in countries such as Russia, Belarus and, yes, Ukraine employ administrative resources in various and creative ways. In Russia, the ruling United Russia party regularly uses local politicians to pressure state employees such as factory workers and schoolteachers to vote. In this year’s city council elections, Moscow officials found ways to disqualify opposition candidates from appearing on the ballot. Incumbent leaders typically use state media to spread propaganda and starve their challengers of airtime. Countries including Russia and Belarus regularly prevent or limit opposition rallies under the pretext of stopping disorder. Governments like Russia’s raise pensions, and oil-rich autocracies like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan spend lavishly on infrastructure projects before an election. Sometimes governments even make public services like transportation and electricity contingent on voting the right way. And of course, these governments use police, prosecutors and state news media to slander opponents with compromising materials, or kompromat.

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These post-Soviet governments have tools that are not available everywhere. The centralized structure of post-Soviet political systems means that presidents select governors, who in turn appoint or can put pressure on district heads and mayors. This top-down control extends all the way to school principals, university presidents and factory managers — who can be counted on to do the leader’s bidding. What’s more, many state employees are concentrated in what are effectively company towns — so it’s relatively easy to march workers to the polls and then watch over them as they vote.

U.S. presidents can’t use government power for personal gain as freely — but they can find ways if they want to.

By comparison, incumbent U.S. presidents are legally and logistically constrained. The Constitution’s separation of powers limits presidents’ ability to concentrate authority in the White House. Many executive actions can be challenged or halted by other branches of government. More limits come from the combination of a competitive two-party system and the fact that citizens vote separately for their local, state and federal government officials. The president cannot rely on, say, the governor of California or the head of the Miami school district to work for his reelection.

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But the United States and post-Soviet governments have more similarities than it may appear. For instance, while the United States does not have state-run television, it does have media outlets that act as the president’s megaphones. Although the White House cannot spend taxpayer dollars without congressional consent, the president has some discretion to allocate federal funds in ways that reward political supporters or fulfill campaign promises.

What’s more, the U.S. system of government gives a sufficiently determined president at least three powerful weapons to shape the field of play. First, if he or she is willing to buck post-Watergate norms intended to insulate the Justice Department from White House interference, the president could have a loyal attorney general open investigations into political opponents. That’s what happens among post-Soviet prosecutors, who typically prioritize their boss’s political interests over the rule of law. For example, in Ukraine, several years before its 2014 pro-democracy revolution, President Viktor Yanukovych used his prosecutor general’s office to arrest his chief rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, on false charges.

Second, the U.S. president can see intelligence from domestic criminal investigations. If he wished, he could collect and selectively release damaging information on his opponents. Again, that’s how it’s done in post-Soviet countries.

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The memo reporting on Trump’s call with Zelensky suggests that he tried to damage his potential rival by exploiting a third prerogative: the president’s nearly unconstrained power to conduct foreign policy. This makes sense. Having the Justice Department prosecute Trump’s rivals without solid evidence would look politically motivated. But a foreign government’s investigation might appear more legitimate, especially if the facts and faces are complicated and difficult for citizens to follow.

Trump still has more opportunities to use government power to his advantage.

If Trump survives this impeachment inquiry, he still has more ways to use his office to gain advantages in 2020. He has shown his willingness to violate long-standing norms that prevented most previous presidents from using all the tools at their disposal and may well do so again.

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Ironically, Zelensky won by a landslide, even though his predecessor and opponent, Petro Poroshenko, heavily used administrative resources to keep him out. International election monitors observed the use of financial incentives as campaign tools, the involvement of public employees in the campaign and imbalances of media coverage.

Using government power, in other words, doesn’t guarantee victory. Other factors matter, including whether the voting is free, how popular the incumbent might be and the opposition’s strategy. But doing so violates the fundamental democratic principle that elections should be a fair fight.

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Scott Radnitz (@SRadnitz) is the Herbert J. Ellison Associate Professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Jackson School of International Studies and director of the Ellison Center at the University of Washington.

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