



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

November 28, 2011

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to express concerns regarding the impact of certain aspects of the current version of Section 1032 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Because the proposed legislation applies to certain persons detained in the United States, the legislation may adversely impact our ability to continue ongoing international terrorism investigations before or after arrest, derive intelligence from those investigations, and may raise extraneous issues in any future prosecution of a person covered by Section 1032.

The legislation as currently proposed raises two principal concerns. First, by establishing a presumption of military detention for covered individuals within the United States, the legislation introduces a substantial element of uncertainty as to what procedures are to be followed in the course of a terrorism investigation in the United States. Even before the decision to arrest is made, the question of whether a Secretary of Defense waiver is necessary for the investigation to proceed will inject uncertainty as to the appropriate course for further investigation up to and beyond the moment when the determination is made that there is probable cause for an arrest.

Section 1032 may be read to divest the FBI and other domestic law enforcement agencies of jurisdiction to continue to investigate those persons who are known to fall within the mandatory strictures of section 1032, absent the Secretary's waiver. The legislation may call into question the FBI's continued use or scope of its criminal investigative or national security authorities in further investigation of the subject. The legislation may restrict the FBI from using the grand jury to gather records relating to the covered person's communication or financial records, or to subpoena witnesses having information on the matter. Absent a statutory basis for further domestic investigation, Section 1032 may be interpreted by the courts as foreclosing the FBI from conducting any further investigation of the covered individual or his associates.

Second, the legislation as currently drafted will inhibit our ability to convince covered arrestees to cooperate immediately, and provide critical intelligence. The legislation introduces a substantial element of uncertainty as to what procedures are to be followed at perhaps the most critical time in the development of an investigation against a covered person. Over the past

The Honorable Carl Levin


decade we have had numerous arrestees, several of whom would arguably have been covered by the statute, who have provided important intelligence immediately after they have been arrested, and in some instances for days and weeks thereafter. In the context of the arrest, they have been persuaded that it was in their best interests to provide essential information while the information was current and useful to the arresting authorities.

Nonetheless, at this crucial juncture, in order for the arresting agents to proceed to obtain the desired cooperation, the statute requires that a waiver be obtained from the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, with certification by the Secretary to Congress that the waiver was in the national security interests of the United States. The proposed statute acknowledges that this is a significant point in an ongoing investigation. It provides that surveillance and intelligence gathering on the arrestee's associates should not be interrupted. Likewise, the statute provides that an ongoing interrogation session should not be interrupted.

These limited exceptions, however, fail to recognize the reality of a counterterrorism investigation. Building rapport with, and convincing a covered individual to cooperate once arrested, is a delicate and time sensitive skill that transcends any one interrogation session. It requires coordination with other aspects of the investigation. Coordination with the prosecutor's office is also often an essential component of obtaining a defendant's cooperation. To halt this process while the Secretary of Defense undertakes the mandated consultation, and the required certification is drafted and provided to Congress, would set back our efforts to develop intelligence from the subject.

We appreciate that Congress has sought to address our concerns in the latest version of the bill, but believe that the legislation as currently drafted remains problematic for the reasons set forth above. We respectfully ask that you take into account these concerns as Congress continues to consider Section 1032.

Sincerely,



Robert S. Mueller III

Director

The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510