Good morning, and welcome, Yasmeen and Damian. Congratulations on your new book.
MS. ABUTALEB: Thanks so much for having us.
MR. PALETTA: Good morning.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Well, of course, it's a huge pleasure for me.
Yasmeen, I want to start with you and look back at that moment when the president was admitted to Walter Reed with COVID himself. We, of course, covered that minute by minute, but you've had a chance to look back. How sick do you now think he was then?
MS. ABUTALEB: Well, what we know from our reporting is that the president was much sicker than his doctors and his advisors were reporting at the time, and like you said, we were covering it minute by minute when it was happening. But there was so much confusion. Damian and I were shocked by the number if advisors who said that they had learned from the president's Twitter or woke up the next morning to find out he was sick as opposed to some official White House channel.
But we know that his oxygen--he was put on oxygen twice the day after he took the test. That was reported, but what wasn't reported was that his oxygen had dipped as low as the 80s, and his doctors were fearing that he was going to have to go on a ventilator, which was one of the motivating factors for sending him to Walter Reed. We know that there are a lot of new details. I'm sure there's still more to learn about it, but that's what we were able to glean in our reporting for this book.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Wow, those are amazing new details.
And, Damian, the FDA at that time scrambled to get the president treatments that weren't readily available to other Americans. How key were they to that recovery, and can you walk us through the process of getting him those treatments?
MR. PALETTA: Sure. So, you know, this is October 2020. There was no approved drug to treat people who had COVID, and you have a president who's 74 years old, medically obese, and is having a really hard time breathing, so this is a crisis situation, and so what they did is they called the FDA Commissioner, Steve Hahn, and said, "We need you to approve this experimental drug immediately," and they wouldn't tell Hahn who it was for. And Hahn said, "Okay. But I need more information," and they were being kind of circumspect. Finally, he realizes, you know, it's for President Trump, and so he's essentially being asked to give the president of the United States, who's in bad health already or, you know, at risk, this experimental drug, and they go through--you know, they go through the process, and they approve it.
And what was interesting, obviously, the president had been promoting hydroxychloroquine for months, you know, a different drug, and that's not what they turned to. They did give the president this monoclonal antibody, but they also gave him a number of other drugs all at once. So, instead of sort of easing him on to things, he was taking a number of drugs at once, and he did miraculously recover. You know, it took a few days, and there was a lot of concern among his doctors and even among, you know, like CDC Director Redfield that there could be a temporary reprieve, and then he could backslide. But, you know, there was this--all these drugs were kind of thrown to him at once. To this day, I think there's still some confusion over what exactly was the drug that saved his life, because there were so many things he was taking at once.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Wow, you've both referred to the level of secrecy. Yasmeen, tell us about that. What were people thinking in the White House at the time, including Meadows? What was his belief?
MS. ABUTALEB: Well, in general, there was just a lot of confusion in the White House that weekend, and, Frances, I think you remember we felt like we couldn't make heads or tails of what was happening because there were such conflicting accounts. One person had one piece of information; another person had a conflicting piece of information. So, it was really difficult to cover in real time.
But what we know is that the chief of staff, Mark Meadows, was consumed with fear that weekend that Trump might die, and I think that was kind of clear when the president was in the hospital and his doctor, Sean Conley, had come out and said he was going better. He had given kind of this upbeat assessment, and Meadows gave, you know, a, quote/unquote, background briefing to reporters, but he was caught on camera so people knew it was him, and he was saying he's not quite out of the woods yet. And then what Damian and I since learned was that he was actually very, very worried at that point, which might explain why he felt like he had to correct the record in some way, even if it was a bit miffed.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: There was also a possibility here, right, of changing the president's mind. Maybe, Yasmeen, first, you could address that question for his medical advisors. Did they hope that he would have a change of heart and start advising social distancing, mask wearing?
And then, Damian, after that, maybe you can take the political point. Was this seen as a political risk a month before the election?
MS. ABUTALEB: His medical advisors did hope this was going to be the turning point. We reported that the CDC director, Robert Redfield, was praying when the--he was praying that weekend that the president would recover, and then he was praying when the president made his return to the White House, he got out of the helicopter, he starts walking up the steps to the balcony, he's praying this whole time that the president is going to get up there, he's going to say, "You need to take this seriously. It can infect even me, the president, the first lady, and our son"--their son, Barron, had been infected that weekend too--"Please wear a mask. I was lucky. I got access to this incredible treatment," like Damian was talking about earlier. He had access to treatment that probably no one else could get, not that combination of drugs and an experimental drug, and they thought, you know, they would be freed of the White House's restraint on their messaging, the president was going to put the doctors front and center, trying to protect against the winter deadly wave that they knew was coming and was already starting a descent.
But that's, of course, not what happened. The president emerged from the experience quite defiant and triumphant. He said, "Don't let it dominate your life. Don't let it scare you," and at that moment, the medical advisors knew it was over. This was the last chance to turn the response around, and it was an opportunity that had passed.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Wow, and so, Damian, politically, what did his political advisors think just a month before the election?
MR. PALETTA: Yeah. I mean, it's fascinating. I think one of the startling revelations that Yasmeen and I came across in our reporting was that there was no plan, even though the president was incapacitated and he was hooked up to oxygen twice, right? I mean, that's a scary moment for the United States. There was no plan to brief or to swear in Vice President Pence if things really deteriorated. So, they were completely unprepared at the White House for this going even further south, and that just shows how they just could not wrap their heads around the possibility of the president not getting across the finish line of the election.
The president decided that he wanted this to be over and behind him. He was chomping at the bit to kind of move on and resume campaigning. It was just a couple days later that he was starting to make public appearances, and I think the mentality that he tried to show the American people was that "If I can beat this virus, so can you. We can't be afraid of this virus. We need to move on with our lives." And I think a lot of Americans found that really appealing. You know, he couldn't be defeated. You know, the virus knocked him on his back, but he got back up.
But this attitude, I think, Biden kind of pounced on thinking, "Wow, President Trump really put us at risk. Look what could have happened," and so there were these really diverging narratives that ran across the finish line from both parties, with the president saying, "We have to move on," and, you know, at the time, former Vice President Biden saying, "We have to finally take this virus seriously or it's only going to get worse."
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Wow, another stunning revelation about how the thinking was going.
I'd like to step back just a bit, Yasmeen, and talk to you about the big takeaways. As we talked about, you covered this all moment by moment, minute by minute. Now you have this chance to look back at the big picture. What did writing this book teach you about--through this wider lens about what happened last year? What's the biggest single takeaway?
MS. ABUTALEB: Well, like you said, we were covering this minute by minute, but I think we all remember there were so many events happening at once. There were days or weeks where a number of huge events happened, and it wasn't clear how they all fit together. And sometimes they were intentional events. Sometimes they were forced errors, whether it was from a speech or a briefing. So, it was hard to see how it all fit together and what it meant for the larger response.
We felt like this book gave us an opportunity to take a step back, to look at the larger narrative, to see how all these pieces fit together, to, yes, uncover new anecdotes, new scoops. There were a lot of people who were willing to talk, especially after the president lost the election and even more when he left office, to be more candid and share experiences that they hadn't shared before, so that was really valuable.
But I think we wanted to put all of this in one place to see what the overarching narrative was and what we could take away from it, and what we found was the government had failed its people like never before in modern history, and I think we can see that. 600,000 people have died.
You know, Frances, this virus was always going to be difficult for the United States, no matter who was the president. There were always going to be people who died, but we came away believing not as many people that needed to died, and that there were many opportunities to turn the response around that we hadn't learned about last year that were either ignored or they took too long to make decisions or they didn't make the decisions they needed to make, and those were really catastrophic, devastating consequences of that.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Wow, so, Yasmeen, you got the health policy, obviously, but, Damian, your specialty is economics, and one of the key tensions throughout this whole pandemic has been between the drive to reopen the economy, to put the economy first, and the public health experts. What have you learned, Damian, about the tensions between those two groups, particularly when Vice President Pence took over running the task force in the White House?
MR. PALETTA: You know, it's a fascinating question, and I think Yasmeen and my belief on this evolved over the course of our reporting. Initially, it seemed like the view in the White House was that the economy was going to be destroyed if they couldn't move past the virus, and so they had to reopen the economy or the virus would not only lead to death, but it would lead to a great depression.
And so, there was this--you know, remember in late March, the president said he wanted to reopen everything by Easter, which was April 12th. April 12th would end up being one of the deadliest days of the pandemic at the time. So, they were really trying to jump the gun and reopen really quickly, and then there was this big debate about states and which states should go first and obviously a really difficult debate that still continues about schools and how they should reopen.
We had thought, you know, and a lot of people in the White House had thought and Congress thought that there--you cannot have the economy be held back. You just had to move the economy forward. But what we learned over the course of this--and especially later into 2020, when the economy started to slide back again was that the economy could not move forward. It was incapable of going forward until the virus was settled. The government had to sort out the virus. They had to, you know, get people healthier, come up with vaccines, come up with proper ways of testing, make sure people were wearing masks to stop the spread. Only then could the economy recovery. It wasn't one or the other. These things were inseparable, and I think it just took so long for them to realize that, and unfortunately, a lot of jobs were lost in the meantime, and obviously, thousands and thousands of lives were lost too.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: So, Damian, just to follow up on that, did you get any new insight into discussions, for example, between his economic advisors and public health advisors? Was there a dialogue going on there, and if so, were the public health advisors listened to?
MR. PALETTA: Well, that's a great question. There was a big meeting in the Oval Office on March 11th with the public health advisors, and Steven Mnuchin, the Treasury Secretary, was there. And they were advocating--the public health advisors were advocating aggressively for a travel ban from Europe, and Mnuchin was really upset. You know, if you block all travel from Europe, this could lead to a great depression, you know, and he was really worried that they--at the time, I think there was only a couple deaths. You know, it seemed like a big overreaction to him, but in retrospect, they were right. This was going to get a lot worse.
And then there was another moment, I think a month or two later, when Larry Kudlow, who was the head of the National Economic Council and who was kind of made famous--or infamous by his comments in late February when he said that the virus was being contained and it was airtight, he went into a meeting with all the health advisors and everyone else in the White House and said, "Listen, we need to tell people to wear the masks. You know, like, the masks are what's preventing this from--our inability to unify behind a mask policy is making the economy suffer," and so he was advocating aggressively internally for people to wear masks. But the White House would just never, you know, gel behind that idea because the president was really opposed. Mark Meadows thought the base would revolt if they were telling people to wear masks. There was a lot of stuff going on, you know, kind of back-channeling. There were some different messages from the economics team, but they never really got anywhere because there was a lot of political interference in the top of the White House.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: So, Yasmeen, now that we're talking about masking, you have this extraordinary story about an HHS plan to give every American household masks. What happened there, and what went awry?
MS. ABUTALEB: The HHS Emergency Preparedness Chief at the time, someone named Robert Kadlec, had contacted a number of undergarment manufacturers in the U.S. like Hanes and Jockey and organized them and asked them to convert some of their manufacturing facilities to produce masks for every American. This was in March.
The administration had not yet unified behind a mask policy, but the medical advisors were starting to get there. And so, HHS thought if we just send every American a mask through the U.S. Postal Service, it comes from the president, that will depoliticize this, "We'll just make sure everyone has a mask. They'll start wearing it," because at the time, as you know, there was nothing to combat coronavirus other than public health behavior, social distancing and remote work and then masks.
So, they present this plan to the White House task force in late March. The then HHS Secretary Alex Azar models the mask for the group, and he gets ridiculed for the way it looks. Someone says, "It looks like you have underwear on your face." Another person says, "It looks like a training bra," and then the vice president's chief of staff, Marc Short, went to the vice president and told him to pull it off the agenda and said it wasn't ready.
There was also some concern because the president was waging a war against the U.S. Postal Service at the time in anticipation of a lot of mail-in voting for the election, that he was just not going to go for a plan that relied on U.S. Postal Service.
It was an example of something that could have been really beneficial for the country to just send these masks out to make sure every American had one. It wasn't about whether you were Republican or Democrat or where you lived. It was just something everyone was going to do to protect themselves and each other, but it got tossed aside. It never got brought back up again, and a lot of the health officials we talked to really regretted this. I mean, they wonder what would have happened if, one, the president had come out and really endorsed the CDC mask policy, not undercut it when he announced it by saying he wasn't going to wear one and it's voluntary and he didn't like how masks looked, and then they, of course, became this political cudgel, and it became such a politicized issue that you were either for individualism and freedom or you were for a tyranny or you were for protecting your neighbor. You know, it just became a symbol of so much, and it really divided the country.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Damian, one of the people you write about, obviously, is the president's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and there are conflicting reports. He appears to have been very angry at one point about mask delays saying we'll all be dead by June, and then at the same time, he was saying to the media that it's all okay, you know, everything will be okay. What did you learn about what he was really--that he and other officials were really thinking at that time?
MR. PALETTA: I mean, Yasmeen--yeah. Yasmeen and I found Jared Kushner to be a fascinating character in the pandemic response. I think people have tried to paint him one way or the other, and it's not that simple.
He did not really become involved until mid-March. He was kind of staying on the sidelines because he always got accused of, you know, jumping in and intervening and things. He doesn't really get pulled in until the president makes that disastrous Oval Office speech on March 11th. Vice President Pence realizes they're in over their heads, so they call in Jared Kushner. You know, they obviously don't have any of the supplies they need. They don't have any real way to combat this.
Jared Kushner comes in and does start kind of breaking the glass and getting things done and calling people and trying to track down masks and ventilators and everything else. I think a lot of people in the White House, even people who aren't his biggest fans, felt like he did make things happen, but he did things in his own way. You know, he created this shadow task force. There was a real task force and then a Jared Kushner task force, that they weren't always communicating and sharing things, and then there was a point about a month after he entered the picture when he just disappeared. And he went to go try to work on the Middle East peace plans that he was trying to finalize before the end of the president's term, and so he kind of came in splashing the pool and then he just jumped out.
There was this point, I think, halfway through when no one was clear who was in charge. There was a point when Birx seemed to be in charge. Fauci was always making comments. The president kind of came in and came out. There's Pence and Meadows and Kushner. He did play a role, and he did get things done for sure. He obviously played a big role in Operation Warp Speed, which was a big success, but his role was so temporary that I think a lot of people felt confused, especially when he left and there was a huge leadership vacuum.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: There are a whole series of characters whom we wrote about during the year, and you're able to give a more detailed picture of their background and their motivations, and I'd love to ask you in turn around two of them. Deborah Birx, Yasmeen, she's credited early in the book with really managing Trump who was so unpredictable at times. Tell us about how she did manage him, and then, Damian, after that, if you can tell us a little bit more about Fauci and this extraordinary moment when he was so under threat and the white powder moment.
MS. ABUTALEB: Well, Damian and I spent a lot of time trying to understand Deborah Birx because I think the public perception of her is a bit of a caricature based on her public comments and what people kind of took away.
I think a lot of it had to do with the fact that people expected a lot of her. She was this public servant. She had this celebrated public health career. She had been a public servant for 40 years, and I think people were really taken aback, including people who knew her, when she started praising the president in public saying he was really attuned to the data. And I think they felt like she was kind of getting sucked into the Trump vortex, the way a lot of people do.
But what Damian and I found was she was making a calculation. She knew that to maintain the president's influence, she needed to signal that he understood what she was presenting to him. She was constantly aggregating data. She was working with her European counterparts when the U.S. didn't have very good data to try to come up with projections, and so when she made those comments saying the president is attuned to the data and the granularity that were kind of mocked, she was getting ready to try to convince him to shut down the country for another 30 days. And she was thinking if he's going to shut down the country based on this data, then he better understand it. We don't think she got enough credit for that because she was really the one who put together the slides and the projections and made the case to the president for those extra 30 days, which likely saved a lot of lives.
But then what happened was after that, the president resented the shutdown. The pandemic wasn't over after that, and I think he was under the impression that it would be. And she lost a lot of her influence, and I think people were disappointed that she didn't speak out in the same way that Dr. Fauci did.
One element that Damian and I spent some time reporting out was the relationship both Dr. Birx and Dr. Fauci had with HIV/AIDS activists who they had known for 30 or 40 years. They both had close relationships with them, and the activists stayed in very close touch with Dr. Fauci. They would hold him accountable and tell him when they thought he could do better or what message they thought he should be trying to get out, connecting him with state and local public health officials on the ground so that he knew what problems they were facing. And with Dr. Birx, they felt like they lost that partner in the government. They didn't have an open regular dialogue with her, and when they saw some of her comments, I think they were taken aback and thought this is not the woman that we've known and worked with for decades.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: So Fauci comes up--
MR. PALETTA: And yeah--
MS. STEAD SELLERS: --in the course of the conversation.
Go ahead, Damian. Tell us about Fauci.
MR. PALETTA: Well, I was just going to say, yeah, I mean--yeah. I think Dr. Fauci, obviously, he was omnipresent last year, and Yasmeen and I studied a lot of his comments to the media. But we thought that there might be a whole nother side of him that, you know, people didn't know, and I would just like to share two key scenes that really struck us in our reporting.
One is, you know, in August 2020, when the president had pivoted sharply away from Birx and Fauci and others--and, you know, at the time, the president was embracing the ideas of Dr. Scott Atlas, this Stanford radiologist who wanted to reopen the economy as quickly as possible, and so Fauci is getting more than a thousand letters a day emailed to his NIH office, but there's still, you know, some internet sleuths who could find his home address. And so, he was getting maybe a dozen letters sent there that security wasn't intercepting.
What he would do is he would bring those letters to the office and then open them on his desk when he had some downtime, and so there is this moment in August when he takes an envelope, takes a letter opener, and slides it open, and then all this white powder explodes from the envelope and covers his face and his clothes. And he's kind of paralyzed with fear for a second, you know, oh my gosh, this could be ricin, he thinks, which would kill him. There's no anecdote. This could be anthrax, which he could take a medicine for, but it would be a real mess, or it could be a hoax.
And there's that moment in time, okay, in August 2020 when the whole country is afraid and scared and doesn't know what's going to happen, when the most famous doctor on the planet is just covered in this white powder, and they don't know what to do. And so, you know, security comes barreling in, and they have to strip him naked and decontaminate him, and he's standing in a kiddy pool, essentially, and, you know, having all this stuff cleaned off his body. And it's just this moment, I think, everyone thinks of him on television or making comments, trying to stand up to the president, but he was so close.
And one other thing I wanted to share is there was an interview I did with Sean Doolittle who was--you know, at the time, he was the pitcher for the Washington Nationals, and he had--the Nationals Opening Day was supposed to be in April, but it got pushed back to July. And the Nationals invited Fauci to come throw out the opening pitch, and Sean Doolittle was a relief pitcher. He's a huge Fauci fan, and so he asked the Nats if he could catch the opening pitch.
And so, Doolittle was so excited, and he actually drove to the ballpark that day instead of riding his bike, so his temperature was, you know, below the amount that would allow him to get into the stadium, and when he went to meet Fauci at home plate right before the pitch, he could see in Fauci's eyes kind of the stress and the strain. You know, this was not a person who was happy and thrilled. This is a person that Doolittle told me, he could tell the guy was under enormous pressure.
And so, you know, obviously, Fauci went up to the mound and threw maybe one of the most famous Opening Day pitches of all time, and it was like wide left. And I think, like, little moments like that remind us that these people aren't the two-dimensional folks that we would see on TV and the people whose, like, kind of quotes and comments would kind of make the press. These people had much more going on that Yasmeen and I really, really tried to bring to life for readers because we thought last year was just too important not to.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Right. And you did so very powerfully.
Yasmeen, one of the moments that's attracted a lot of attention about your book is the moment when President Trump suggested repatriating or sending quarantined Americans to Guantanamo Bay. Do you know from your reporting whether that was a presidential musing, or were people beginning to act on that and take it seriously?
MS. ABUTALEB: Well, we know that the president brought it up at least twice. He brought it up once, and aides, I think, kind of dismissively said, "We'll look into it. We'll see," and then when he brought it up again, the aides thought he was serious and that they needed to scuttle the idea, obviously worry about the PR that would result if people found out that this was even being considered, because if you remember, most of the cruise ship passengers at that point were in their seventies and eighties. He's talking about sending elderly, at-risk Americans to Guantanamo Bay to do their quarantine.
But I think the bigger takeaway from that anecdote is how obsessive the president was as early as February about, not protecting Americans and how to keep the virus out and what needed to be done to make sure as few people got infected as possible, but how the U.S. case count reflected personally on him. Instead of thinking about what is the best thing for us to do for Americans, if we bring them back here, do we put other Americans at risk, or where do we put them here so that they can get the care they need and not put other people at risk, it was we need to keep the case count as low as possible. And we also report in that anecdote that he called the then Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar, furious about the decision to fly back 14 infected Americans from the Diamond Princess cruise ship because it doubled the U.S. case count. It went from 14 to 28, and he told Azar, "This doubles my numbers overnight. These people never should have been brought back here," and that's a little bit later when the idea for Guantanamo comes up.
This obsession with the case count was a theme throughout the response. You saw it play out when he wanted to keep a ship on the coast of California. You saw when he wanted to reduce the amount of testing so that there weren't as many cases. It just played into this broader theme of the public relations crisis as opposed to the public health crisis.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Damian, a lot of the problems that the Trump administration had to contend with were there before the coronavirus came along, including underfunded local public health department, and even as the pandemic began, we saw science in progress in real time, watching it change as an iterative process. Did you at any point when you look back feel that the administration was wrongly blamed for things that would have been a real challenge, structural deficit, sort of been a real challenge for any administration?
MR. PALETTA: Absolutely. I mean, this was a completely freak event, a virus. I mean, the nightmare scenario is to have a virus like this, a respiratory virus that spreads asymptomatically. So, people are transporting the virus who don't know they're sick, and some people, the virus would essentially suffocate, and some people, it would pass through like a ghost. This is an incredibly challenging virus to stop, and we're seeing still in so many countries, it's creating huge problems. And so, I think a lot of people--frankly, President Trump's approval rating in late March was quite high when there was a lot of fear. People were looking to him for leadership, and he was doing those daily briefings, and I think a lot of people felt like he was on top of things and it was under control.
You know, there maybe was this kind of grace period when the country did kind of rally together and think, "All right. We're faced with a challenge. We can do this. We've been through challenges before," but what happened was, you know, the way that science was severed from policy, the way that the politics were infused into these decisions, especially, I think, beginning in April and picking up in May and then in June, obviously, Vice President Pence writes the op-ed, there will not be a second wave. And then that was when the second wave began. I mean, I think when it became clear that the White House was not interested in focusing on some of these really core scientific discoveries, that's when things really went off the rails, and what became really dangerous was when the country split in half. And when half the country believed everything the president said and half the country wouldn't believe a word he said, then you're in a situation like we saw in October, November, December when the virus is just kind of mowing the country down, and no one knows who to believe. And there's just kind of fear everywhere.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Yasmeen, I think we have time for just one last quick question, and it's a big one. But the political fallout from all of this, do you think--what has the pandemic taught voters? Do they care about what Damian just described, the misinformation and the lack of attention to science? What does this mean politically going ahead?
MS. ABUTALEB: I think voters absolutely did care about the decisions, and I think that was a big part of why President Trump lost the election. We report in the book, before the pandemic really hit the U.S., he was looking kind of unstoppable heading into the election. The economy was strong. He had weathered the impeachment hearings and been acquitted. So, he looked pretty strong heading into reelection, and then what we found was that voters very much did care about his handling. There's a scene we report in the book where he gets polling numbers showing that 80 percent of Republicans would favor a mask mandate if it meant that we could reopen and resume some activities, and he rejected that, led by his chief of staff, Mark Meadows, at the time. I think there was absolutely political fallout, and I think millions of Americans have recognized how much leadership matters in something like this.
President Trump doesn't bear all the blame. There were a number of people in this administration in the response who bear responsibility, but it does start from the top, and he was the one who set the environment that I think set the stage for a lot of these, frankly, poor decisions that led to a lot of suffering.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Yasmeen and Damian, thank you both so much for joining me today. That was a fascinating conversation.
MR. PALETTA: Thank you so much.
MS. ABUTALEB: Thanks, Frances.
MS. STEAD SELLERS: Thank you for joining us, everybody, and stick with us at 2:00 p.m. today, my colleague, Ellen Nakashima, will be back to talk about cybersecurity threats against the governments over the world and also private companies. She'll be in discussion with the Senator from Maine, Angus King, and also the CEO of FireEye, Kevin Mandia. That's 2:00 p.m. today.
I'm Frances Stead Sellers. Thank you so much for joining us.
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