Chapter One: The Revolt of the General
The two generals were ushered into the president's office on the second floor of the east wing of the White House in midafternoon. It was Tuesday, December 30, 1862, and the purpose of their interview with Mr. Lincoln was, to say the least, highly irregular. It was their considered opinion that General Burnside was about to lead the Army of the Potomac to disaster, and they saw it as their duty to prevent this from happening.
The two made a decidedly odd pairing. Brigadier General John Newton looked the very picture of a professional soldier. He was forty, tall and stiffly erect and with a determined look about him. Descended from a First Family of Virginia, Newton had graduated from West Point second in class twenty years before, entered the elite Corps of Engineers, and stayed resolutely at his post when Virginia left the Union in 1861. In the Army of the Potomac he had compiled a careful combat record, rising to the command of a division in William F. Smith's Sixth Corps of William B. Franklin's Left Grand Division. While Newton was not entirely unfamiliar with the ways of Washington--his father had been a congressman from Virginia for twenty-nine years--he would express himself uncomfortable about approaching the president this way. Indeed, when he came up to the capital that morning from army headquarters on the Rappahannock, General Newton had not had the least thought of going anywhere near the White House.
His companion, by contrast, was quite at home in this setting. Brigadier General John Cochrane, commander of a brigade under Newton, forty-nine years old and entirely lacking in soldierly bearing, was a political operator to his fingertips. Where John Newton was F.F.V., John Cochrane was Mozart Hall politico. He had served two terms as a congressman from New York City just before the war. A conservative Democrat, he raised a regiment in 1861 and rode into the army on the coattails of the Republican administration's call for bipartisan support of the war effort. Cochrane soon enough rose from political colonel to political general and proved adept at wire-pulling in Washington. As recently as October he had been sent to the capital by the then commanding general of the Army of the Potomac, George B. McClellan, to lobby for McClellan's reappointment as general-in-chief of the Union armies. In this cause Cochrane enlisted a Cabinet secretary, Salmon P. Chase, and the country's largest newspaper, the New York Herald, and spoke directly to Mr. Lincoln on the subject. In the event, his efforts were unavailing, and within a month McClellan was displaced as army commander by Ambrose Burnside. Now, on this December afternoon call at the White House, Cochrane, with Newton in tow, was conspiring to see Burnside displaced as army commander.
Cochrane and Newton had not concocted this intrigue by themselves. They merely represented the latest--and boldest--evidence of a generals' revolt in the Army of the Potomac aimed at Burnside's overthrow. The two ringleaders of the revolt were Cochrane's and Newton's immediate superiors, Major Generals William Franklin and William Smith.
Ten days earlier, on December 20, Franklin and Smith, going without scruple over Burnside's head, had opened a private correspondence with the president on the subject of grand strategy. Disdaining the army's current campaigning on the Rappahannock (General Burnside's approach, said Franklin and Smith, "cannot possibly be successful"), they argued for a return to McClellan's approach to Richmond by way of the Virginia Peninsula--a campaign that had consumed five months that spring and summer and been sharply repulsed by the Confederates. Lincoln had never cared for McClellan's approach, and he told the two dissident generals that he could not see how their proposed return to the Peninsula would overcome what he called "the old difficulty."
In due course General Burnside would turn up the names of seven of his officers conspiring to overthrow him, but in truth just then there were thousands more in the Army of the Potomac who had lost faith in the commanding general. This was an army scarred by repeated failures on the battlefield, yet no previous failure had seemed so senseless and so pointless as Fredericksburg, fought on December 13. Never had the troops fought more gallantly than in their repeated stormings of Marye's Heights behind the town; never was gallantry so obviously and so visibly wasted. On Marye's Heights the Rebel general Longstreet remarked that so long as his ammunition held out and they kept coming, he would kill every Yankee soldier in Burnside's army, and for a time, until darkness intervened, it seemed that he might. Federal casualties were 12,653, greater even than on that terrible day at Antietam Creek in September, and nothing whatever was gained. December 13, 1862, was beyond doubt the worst day in the experience of the Army of the Potomac.
It was General Burnside announcing his intention to resume the campaign that had sent Newton and Cochrane hurrying to Washington. From army headquarters at Falmouth on December 29 came orders for the troops to prepare to march, carrying three days' rations and sixty rounds of ammunition. No details of Burnside's plan were given, but clearly it would mean another crossing of the Rappahannock and another battle at or near Fredericksburg. Later Generals Franklin and Smith would have difficulty recalling the purpose of Newton's and Cochrane's trip to the capital. Franklin testified that he "had no idea ... the President, or anybody else who had any power" would be visited; Smith said he simply could not remember what his two subordinates had in mind. Yet the fact that with the army under marching orders a general of division and a general of brigade were granted leaves by their superiors to travel to Washington suggests these memory lapses were more convenient than real. The far more credible assumption is that William B. Franklin and William F. Smith knew exactly what their two generals were planning, and in fact had put them up to it.
On reaching the capital that morning of December 30, Cochrane had Newton wait at the Metropolitan Hotel while he hunted up someone of influence to listen to their tale. He went first in search of the head of the Senate's Committee on Military Affairs, Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, and Congressman Moses F. Odell of New York, member of the powerful Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. But Congress was in recess for the holidays and both men had left town. Nothing daunted, Cochrane determined to take his case directly to the top, to the White House. When he arrived there he encountered an old New York acquaintance, Secretary of State William H. Seward. He told enough of his story to Seward to persuade him to get them in to see the president. While Seward was arranging the appointment, Cochrane hurried back to the Metropolitan to collect the no doubt startled Newton. Now, in mid-afternoon, the two generals found themselves face to face with their commander-in-chief.
Poor Newton was in a dilemma. As the senior officer he had to take the lead, and what he wanted to say--what he truly believed--was that the Army of the Potomac was demoralized because it had lost all confidence in General Burnside. Should it again suffer defeat on the Rappahannock, which he believed was imminent, it would not be (as he later told the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War) "a mere defeat, as before, but it would be a destruction." Newton would have been comfortable enough saying this to a civilian, say an influential member of Congress, but "to come square out" to his commander-in-chief was a very different matter. Should he appear to be criticizing his superior with intent to have him relieved (which was just what he and his fellow dissidents devoutly hoped would happen), he could be charged with "manifestly improper" conduct and cashiered. As Newton later confessed, he found himself "in a very delicate position in this conversation." He hemmed and hawed and talked all around the subject and hoped that somehow the president would understand that the army was indeed dispirited and would then investigate matters for himself.
Lincoln saw quickly enough what was really on Newton's mind, and wondered out loud if there might be some intent here "to injure" General Burnside. Quickly, desperately, Newton said that was the furthest thing from his mind. It was his intent only to stress "the condition of the army." At this point Cochrane weighed in to smooth things over. This was not unlike the give-and-take of political negotiation, an art John Cochrane was entirely familiar with, and he soon steered the conversation to the higher plane of selfless duty, with motives of purest patriotism. He confirmed by "personal observation" what General Newton had said of the condition of the army; surely the president could see such testimony as evidence "of patriotism and of my loyalty to the government...." Mr. Lincoln recognized a practiced political hand at work, and no doubt with a sigh "resumed his ordinary manner." By Cochrane's account, the president said he was glad they had visited him, "and that good would come of the interview." With that the two generals took their leave.
From the perspective of those in the army plotting to overthrow General Burnside, something good did indeed emerge from the interview. At 3:30 that afternoon a telegram went out from the War Department to General Burnside on the Rappahannock. "I have good reason for saying you must not make a general movement of the army without letting me know," it read, and it was signed, "A. Lincoln."
Ambrose Everett Burnside was not chosen to replace General McClellan, back in November, because he displayed any obviously striking military talents. Other generals had served in the Army of the Potomac longer than he, and much more capably. His only sustained fighting record with this army, before commanding it, was in the Maryland campaign that September, in which he hardly distinguished himself. Before agreeing to accept the post, on November 7, Burnside had earlier twice rejected Lincoln's efforts to put him in McClellan's place. He told the president he was simply not qualified to lead a great army--certainly not as qualified as his friend General McClellan.
Such frankness was one of the attractions of this appealing man. He not only accepted full responsibility for the Fredericksburg disaster, but sent his statement to the newspapers to ensure its wide circulation. A fellow Potomac army general, Gouverneur K. Warren, rendered a widely accepted verdict on General Burnside: "A good fellow certainly, manly, honest, and comely." In addition to his personable nature, Burnside was without political connections or ambitions--an important consideration in this highly politicized army--and was well liked by the men in the ranks. This latter was a most important consideration, for there was real concern in Washington about how the troops would react to the dismissal of their beloved "Little Mac." Ambrose Burnside might not have been the best man for the job of commanding general, but he was surely the safest one in the peculiar circumstances of wrenching General McClellan out of the army he was so much a part of.
Having praise for Burnside the man, Gouverneur Warren went on to take the measure of Burnside the soldier, and found him wanting: "But of only moderate mind and attainments, who has made our cause suffer more in battle than any other Genl...." Observers concluded that Burnside's humility, which he displayed publicly so often that it was played up by the newspapers, amounted to self-fulfilling prophecy. George Gordon Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps, thought this trait a major factor in Burnside's troubles. "Another drawback," he told Mrs. Meade, "was a very general opinion among officers and men, brought about by his own assertions, that the command was too much for him. This greatly weakened his position." Neither Warren nor Meade was part of the cabal formed against Burnside, yet they saw clearly the army commander's wounds, and the sharks circling for the kill.
Burnside was startled by Lincoln's telegraphed order to make no advance without first consulting him. He believed no one outside the high command of the Army of the Potomac knew his plans; the telegram must mean there were military operations elsewhere requiring his cooperation. He replied that he was rescinding orders already issued, and would come up to Washington the next day to consult. Morning of the last day of the year 1862 found him in the president's office.
Lincoln came directly to the point. Certain general officers of the Army of the Potomac had called on him--he did not reveal their names--to say that the army was moving to the attack, and that the attack "would result in disaster." By Burnside's testimony, he was too surprised at this to remember everything the president told him of the visitors' story, yet he did record one very important element of that story that Newton and Cochrane would neglect to mention in recounting their December 30 call on the president. According to Burnside, the president "said that he had understood that no prominent officer of my command had any faith in my proposed movement." It is highly unlikely that Generals Newton and Cochrane had sufficient contact with every "prominent officer" in the army to risk making such a ringing judgment on their own. But generals of the station of William Franklin and William Smith certainly had those contacts--and would have been glad enough to offer this glittering nugget to their two subordinates before sending them off to Washington on their mission.
Burnside launched into an earnest explanation of his planned movement. In the December 13 battle he had thrown pontoon bridges across the Rappahannock directly in front of Fredericksburg. This time he planned to cross a flanking column a half-dozen miles downstream from the town, and to make a show of crossing above the town as well. All this would be combined with a powerful raiding force of cavalry slicing in behind the Confederates from the west to cut their communications with Richmond. The plan displayed a good deal more imagination than Burnside's earlier head-on lurch across the river, yet the president was uneasy about it. What he had been told of the attitude of Burnside's generals troubled him, and Burnside provided small comfort with the admission that "some of my general officers" did indeed have what he termed "misgivings" about the operation.
Lincoln said he wanted to hear what his advisers, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, had to say on the subject. Unveiling his streak of humility, Burnside said that if both his officers and his men lacked confidence in him, he thought he should resign his command. And since he was on the subject, he added that as far as he could tell, there was a definite lack of confidence in the army toward both Secretary Stanton and General Halleck. Taken all together, there was very little in this conversation to give Mr. Lincoln much encouragement about the military picture.
The day's events had generated in General Burnside a rising anger, and that evening, in his room at Willard's Hotel, he composed a forthright letter to the president. What he had said that morning ought to be on the record, he thought. He began by asserting that Secretary of War Stanton "has not the confidence of the country." To which he added, "The same opinion applies with equal force in regard to General Halleck." It was, he observed pointedly, "of the utmost importance" that both secretary of war and general-in-chief possess "the confidence of the people and the army." From that it was but a tiny step to the inference that General Burnside thought both men should resign.
As for himself, Burnside left no doubt about what he thought. Because he was so out of step with his general officers, brought on no doubt by their "lack of confidence in me," it would be in the best interests of the president and the country that he resign. "In this case it is highly necessary that this army should be commanded by some other officer, to whom I will most cheerfully give way."
January 1, 1863, New Year's Day, promised to be a milestone for Abraham Lincoln. The Emancipation Proclamation, with his signature that day, would mark out a new direction for the war and for the country. The signing ceremony was scheduled for noon. First, however, the president had to meet with Burnside, Stanton, and Halleck at the War Department to discuss what was to be done, if anything, with the Army of the Potomac.
This strategy meeting deeply disappointed him. Burnside began by handing his newly written letter of resignation (and comment) to the president, who read it and without a word returned it to him. That was not enough for Burnside. He was Burnside the Honest, believing he owed it to Stanton and Halleck to tell the whole truth of what he had told the president. He announced his opinion that neither they (nor he) had the confidence of the army and of the country. The anti-Burnside cabal would claim that Burnside brazenly told Stanton and Halleck to their faces that they should resign. Halleck blandly denied that any such thing was said in his presence, which was true enough but evasive. No one at this conference was so obtuse as to miss Burnside's unsubtle hint that they as well as he ought to resign.
Lincoln's silence closed debate on the matter of resignations, and then they became sidetracked over the identity of the president's December 30 visitors. The more he reflected on it the angrier Burnside had become at these talebearers who (he thought) had betrayed him, and he wanted them cashiered. Halleck was equally indignant in calling for their dismissal, but the president refused to give up the names.
When he tried to turn the discussion to Burnside's plan of campaign, Lincoln gained no better results. Burnside still wanted to make the movement despite his high command's opposition, and consequently he wanted specific approval and support from Washington. Stanton would not commit himself on such military matters. Halleck spoke only in the most general terms of an advance on the Rappahannock, insisting that it was the responsibility of the general commanding on the scene to plot the time and place and nature of the movement. Soon they were back where they began. "No definite conclusion was come to, during the conference, in reference to the subject of a movement," Burnside testified.
Here was another of those moments that had frustrated President Lincoln so often during the long months of General McClellan's command. Here again, the president could not get an army, or a general, to move or to act or to do anything he wanted. After the meeting he wrote a letter to General Halleck. The general-in-chief, he said, knew what Burnside wanted to do and knew the situation on the Rappahannock. "If in such a difficulty as this you do not help, you fail me precisely in the point for which I sought your assistance." He wanted Halleck to go with Burnside to the army, look over the ground there, confer with the generals, and come back with a definite opinion "that you do approve, or that you do not approve the plan. Your military skill is useless to me, if you will not do this."
The post of general-in-chief in the American army was not then well defined; whatever definition it had was due to the man who happened to be holding it at the time. McClellan had manned the post during the winter of 1861-62 and did so actively, working closely with his generals in the field to formulate plans and coordinate movements. Henry Halleck played the role differently. He hated the job, for one thing, and remained in it only out of a sense of duty. He saw himself essentially as chief clerk of the army, making sure that things were done in proper form and by the book, that military policies--established by others--were carried out in the most efficient way possible.
In a letter to Burnside a few days later, Halleck nicely stated this attitude. Yes, he wrote, there should be a general advance on the Rappahannock. Yes, he would support such a move. Yes, there were various avenues of approach, all of them with merit. "The character of the movement, however, must depend upon circumstances which may change any day and almost any hour." As he saw it, it was simply not his job to do what the president wanted, to go into the field and pass judgment on specific operations. In his response to the president's letter, he said that if he was required to obey these instructions he wanted to be relieved from the post of general-in-chief. Recognizing that once again he was stymied, Mr. Lincoln wrote across the file copy of his letter to Halleck, "Withdrawn, because considered harsh by Gen. Halleck." The net result of the New Year's Day strategy meeting was the proffered resignations of his two top generals.
When he returned to his headquarters at Falmouth on the Rappahannock, General Burnside was unable to contain either his anger or his anguish. Rather than taking a stoic, determined stance toward his intractable command, he poured out his troubles without reservation to anyone who would listen. Soon enough the commanders of the three grand divisions--William Franklin, Edwin Sumner, and Joseph Hooker--knew all about his trip to Washington, and so did a half-dozen other general officers. General Meade wrote his wife on January 2 that Burnside even read to him the letter of resignation he had offered the president, not only detailing his own reasons for resigning but hinting that the general-in-chief and the secretary of war ought to resign as well. Whatever Burnside hoped to gain by this spasm of confession, its larger effect was to further weaken his already shaky control over the army's officer corps. "God only knows what is to become of us and what will be done," Meade concluded.
Franklin and his cohort "Baldy" Smith were meanwhile doing their best to drum up support within the officer ranks for changing the line of campaign from the Rappahannock to the Peninsula. General Franklin, Meade wrote, "is very positive in his opinion that we cannot go to Richmond on this line...." With Burnside equally adamant in support of the Rappahannock approach, the Franklin-Smith cabal recognized that its best hope lay in seeing Burnside resign, to be succeeded by the general many in the officer corps believed should never have been relieved--George B. McClellan. Surely a condition of McClellan's return would be the freedom to choose his own line of advance in Virginia. No one could imagine this being anything but a return to the Peninsula.
Gouverneur Warren, in command of a brigade under Meade, was certain that after Fredericksburg there was but one answer to the army's command problem: "We must have McClellan back with unlimited and unfettered powers. His name is a tower of strength to everyone here...." General McClellan was then the army's highest ranking general on active duty, although at the moment he was without a command and posted in New York City writing a voluminous report on his fifteen months as head of the Army of the Potomac. McClellan had shaped that army in his own image, convincing those in the ranks to identify personally with him and with his leadership. "I am to watch over you as a parent over his children," he announced to his troops; "and you know that your General loves you from the depths of his heart." Many had taken him to their hearts, and many still felt that way. "He is still admired by the army & spoken of with love & confidence," wrote Colonel William H. Withington of the 17th Michigan ten days after Fredericksburg. "Burnside is liked of course, who could not help liking Burnside but they feel as though McClellan was their man." George W. Lambert of the 14th Indiana was more direct. The slogan "McClellan is the man," he wrote, "is a great deal more unanimous now than it was before this grand failure."
Even stronger and more lasting was McClellan's impact on the Army of the Potomac's officer corps. The officer ranks, from grand division down through corps, division, and brigade, were honeycombed with men who owed their places to General McClellan. They were imbued with his very careful, very cautious, very restrained style of command, a style that set a high premium on obedience to the letter of orders and a low priority on individuality and initiative. The Army of the Potomac was the Union's shield, McClellan had said: it must never under any circumstances be put at serious risk; it must always be preserved to fight another day. If McClellan and his disciples could be said to have a motto, it was "Better safe than sorry."
To be sure, while a majority of these disciples (like General Warren) might long for the day of McClellan's return, they would do their duty (as they conceived it) under General Burnside. The cabal led by Franklin and Baldy Smith set a course to undercut the commanding general, to force him out to clear the way for the return of their favorite. This revolt of the generals might be limited in size, but should it make headway it was unlikely to encounter much opposition from within the officer corps of the army. General Burnside had few diehard supporters.
The contretemps in the high command soon was the talk of Washington. General Samuel Heintzelman, in charge of the capital's defenses, recorded in his diary on January 5 that General Halleck had described for him Burnside's plan to cross the Rappahannock, "when two Generals came to town, saw Mr. Lincoln & he sent orders not to do it." Heintzelman had his own sources of inside information, and added, "I heard since that Genls. Newton & Cochrane who got leave from Gen. Franklin were the officers." He could not understand how "such conduct is tolerated. "
On the same date, Sam Ward, a veteran Washington lobbyist, was writing of the latest reports he had picked up from the army--that General Burnside had offered his resignation to the president, and recommended that Stanton and Halleck also resign. Speculating that major change was imminent for the Army of the Potomac, Ward introduced another name into the witches' brew at the high-command level--Major General Joseph Hooker.
"You will recollect that I told you long since of Hooker," Ward reminded his correspondent, "and if possible he would through his unscrupulous action succeed in ousting everyone above him." He named Hooker the new favorite of the Republican radicals, one who "will answer their purposes." Had he seen this last remark, Joe Hooker would have nodded in agreement.
General Hooker wanted just as devoutly as any in the Franklin-Smith cabal to see Burnside overthrown, only with a notably different outcome. He had as little use for McClellan in army command as he had for Burnside, and so he operated independently of the cabal. Joe Hooker had long since come to think of Joe Hooker as the best man to lead the Army of the Potomac. He had expected to be McClellan's successor; indeed, back in November, only by threatening to give Hooker the command had the administration persuaded Burnside to take it. (Ambrose Burnside actively disliked very few people, and Joe Hooker was one of the few.)
After that setback Hooker plotted his campaign more carefully. He made sure the press was aware of the addled state of the high command. Even before Fredericksburg he denounced Burnside's generalship in an interview with Henry Villard of the New York Tribune. "His language was so severe and, at the same time, so infused with self-assurance," Villard later wrote, that he was sure the general was trying to use him "for his own glorification and for the detraction of others."
Hooker was shrewd enough to give equal attention to the politics of the case. A lifelong Democrat, even an anti-abolitionist, he now paid homage to radical Republicanism without a backward glance. He cultivated in particular Treasury Secretary Chase and Secretary of War Stanton, whom he took to be the most influential Cabinet members. The Fredericksburg disaster seemed to confirm everything Hooker had been saying. When Congress's Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War investigated the management of that battle, Hooker in his testimony was unsparing of Burnside's shortcomings. For good measure, he also found fault with General Franklin's part in the fighting, thus putting down a potential rival. The radical Republicans who dominated the committee found much to applaud in Hooker's testimony. As Sam Ward observed, promoting Joe Hooker's candidacy for army command suited the committee's purposes very nicely--and suitably braced Hooker's confidence. On January 17 Marsena R. Patrick, the army's provost marshal, recorded in his diary, "Hooker says he can have command of this Army when he will say the word. ..."
The Fredericksburg defeat of December 13 had acted like the bursting of a dam, flooding Lincoln with problems that taken together threatened to swamp his presidency. The Army of the Potomac, the Union's principal army, was fighting under its fourth commander in little more than eighteen months and had suffered its worst defeat yet. The bitter divisions within its high command, brought by fractious generals directly to the White House, spilled over into the newspapers and generated partisan debate. The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War's investigation of Fredericksburg was also widely reported in the press, further heating the debate. "Many of these attacks," editorialized the New York Times on January 13, "are obviously and avowedly made in the interest of the late Commander of the Army of the Potomac; while all of them have ... the effect of disheartening the loyal North, and giving encouragement to the rebellion."
Reforms were urged on the president. He was advised to set up a high-level Military Council to furnish sound military advice (from such as General McClellan) and thereby spread the responsibility for decision-making. A Republican caucus in Congress sent a delegation to the White House to demand a shakeup and reconstruction of the Cabinet, which might or might not improve the management of the war but beyond any doubt represented a threat to Mr. Lincoln's leadership. The president adroitly maneuvered out of harm's way, yet he knew the threat had only been postponed, not eliminated.
For many in the North Fredericksburg became a vivid symbol of all that was wrong with the way this war was being waged. It was fresh ammunition for those on the home front with antiwar sentiments, and for the newspapers that fanned those sentiments. Colonel Lucius Fairchild of the 2nd Wisconsin wrote his wife on December 30 that after the battle many in the Army of the Potomac "were most heartily tired of the war, & would be willing to accept peace on most any terms.... I think the fight is out of the men." Colonel Fairchild blamed outside influences for much of this. "A very great deal of the discouragement comes from the North--from Northern papers & from Northern speakers--who to save their own selfish ends would sacrifice all things." Rather than finding encouragement in the newspapers, he wrote, the men read "nothing but howlings against the Administration--against our Generals--detailing all the North has not accomplished--instead of what it has...." And he added, "I am sorry to have cause to think all this--but I must believe what I see...."
The Emancipation Proclamation created further problems for the administration. While it strengthened support for the war among antislavery and radical Republican forces across the North--and promised to bring thousands of black soldiers into the ranks to fight for their freedom--at the same time it seriously weakened coalition support for the war among Democrats. Emancipation promised a social revolution that few were ready for; a war for Union was one thing, a war to end slavery seemed something very different.
Strong feelings were expressed on the subject in the Army of the Potomac. New Englander Edwin O. Wentworth saw by the newspapers, he told his wife, "that we hail the nigger proclamation with pleasure, and are willing to die, all of us, if thereby the nigger can be freed. This is a d----d lie! The army is enthusiastic to go home." The 75th Ohio's Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Constable was discharged from the service "for disloyalty" after publicly denouncing the Proclamation. As one of his men explained it, Constable had said he "did not come out to fight to free the damned niggers, so he got a free pass to Ohio.... Id hate to be in his situation." A New Jersey soldier wrote home that his regiment used to cheer Mr. Lincoln at reviews, "but if he were to appear today the men would be just as eager to receive him with groans."
Pessimism became the common coin for many at home. According to the New York diarist George Templeton Strong, "The way the Dirt-Eaters and Copperheads and sympathizers and compromisers are coming out on the surface of society ... shows that the nation is suffering from a most putrescent state of the national blood...." The Chicago Tribune's Joseph Medill believed that "The people are growing exceedingly tired of the war and are becoming very much discouraged." Medill was sure there would be an armistice stopping the fighting during 1863. "Well what then?" he asked. "Why, we have to fight for a boundary--that is all now left to us...." Governor Oliver Morton of Illinois was of a like mind. Morton described forces in the states of the Old Northwest that would dictate an armistice and strike a bargain with the Confederacy for a new Union "upon the condition of leaving out the New England states; this they believe the Rebel leaders will accept, and so do I." Such despairing talk as this was fueled by a sobering statistic announced in Congress in mid-January. In the North the cost of the war was now running at $2.5 million a day, "Sundays included," a figure so much beyond the government's income that the deficit was growing $1.9 million every day.
At the center of this galaxy of problems, and linked to all of them, lay the army. Victory on the battlefield contained the promise to change everything, restoring morale in the army and on the home front, making all the sacrifices seem worthwhile. Once the army problem was solved, other problems might suddenly seem smaller. But as 1863 began Union victories remained elusive. At the turn of the year, at Murfreesboro in Tennessee, Federals and Confederates fought to bloody exhaustion, and when it was over so little had changed that neither side had a legitimate claim to victory. To the west, along the Mississippi, Federal operations against the citadel of Vicksburg began badly and future prospects there were clouded in uncertainty. In the eastern theater, unless General Burnside could after all generate some kind of victorious campaign on the Rappahannock, the promise was only stalemate--stalemate following months of costly, empty campaigning.
Mr. Lincoln possessed a clear and stark view of what he called the "awful arithmetic" required of the general who commanded the Army of the Potomac. He observed to his secretary, William Stoddard, that at Fredericksburg the Potomac army had lost 50 percent more men than the enemy army, yet if the two should refight that battle, with the same result, every day "through a week of days," the enemy army would be wiped out and the Potomac army would still be "a mighty host." As Stoddard recorded it, the president said that "No general yet found can face the arithmetic, but the end of the war will be at hand when he shall be discovered." Even at that, however, there was the further question: Would the men in the ranks of the Army of the Potomac face the awful arithmetic?
Generals Newton and Cochrane had painted a picture for the president of these men as demoralized, and hinted at the unthinkable--that in another battle under Burnside they might simply refuse to fight. A great deal of talk like this was running through the army. To be sure, there was never a moment in the life of this army (or of any army) when the men in it did not complain about one thing or another. To complain was a soldier's right, and to claim demoralization sometimes had its uses. Captain Henry Abbott of the 20th Massachusetts recorded with sardonic amusement an incident during the recent Fredericksburg battle. "A runaway soldier," he wrote home, "coming full tilt from the town is stopped by the guard at the bridge. `For God's sake, don't stop me,' the soldier cries, `I'm demoralized as hell.'"
Yet it was different now. In the month or two after Fredericksburg evidence that the fighting men of the Army of the Potomac were indeed demoralized was everywhere. One cause of this had been the peculiar visibility of the December battle. The repeated, murderous charges against Marye's Heights occurred in a veritable amphitheater, within sight and hearing of scores of thousands. What happened at the same time offstage, in William Franklin's Left Grand Division, was not so easily seen or known. Burnside had expected Franklin to execute a powerful turning movement against the enemy's flank. Franklin instead displayed all the storied caution of his mentor, General McClellan, and the turning movement dribbled away ineffectually. That left the frontal attacks on Marye's Heights to be seen, and remembered.
Corporal Edward H. Wade of the 14th Connecticut explained it to his homefolks: "The last battle was a wholesale slaughter and they never can get the troops into another such a field." Corporal Wade's regiment was part of the Second Corps, and in mid-January when Burnside reviewed that veteran corps he was (as one officer phrased it) "coldly received by the men." Called upon for the usual three cheers for the general commanding--routine during the days of McClellan--the troops' response was stony silence.
There was a second and even stronger reason for the widespread demoralization. The system that bound these individual soldiers collectively into an army had broken down. The most fundamental needs were not being met. The men were fed badly, clothed badly, housed badly, cared for badly. They were not paid on anything remotely resembling a proper schedule. Hubert Dilger, captain of Battery I, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, would in desperation write directly to President Lincoln to complain that his men had not been paid in almost seven months. Nor was this an extreme case; there was not a man in Burnside's army who could say his pay account was up-to-date and current. For soldiers trying to support a family on their army pay, this was a crisis.
In the matter of pay the fault lay with the War Department (and the Treasury) in Washington, but there was much else wrong that was the fault of the high command of the Army of the Potomac. A hospital steward working near the army's main supply base at Aquia Landing on the Potomac almost casually described for his mother "a convalescent camp that is killing the boys off at the rate of 15 or 20 a day." The sick there were living (and dying) on an unvarying diet of hardtack, salt pork, and black coffee. This diet was bad enough for men who were well; for anyone with dysentery or typhoid it could kill. A few miles away, in the Aquia Landing warehouses, were the vegetables and fresh fruit and soft bread and broths and concentrated milk needed to make them well, and all of it out of reach.
Massachusetts's Lieutenant Henry Ropes, writing home on January 5, said he was able to offer a visitor to camp from Boston nothing but bad beef and worse coffee--"Although when he goes to Headquarters he dines on canvasback ducks and champagne." By way of contrast, Lieutenant Ropes continued, "The men suffering a great deal for lack of fresh food and sufficient variety. Diarrhoea and scurvy almost universal." There were indeed hundreds of cases of scurvy, a disease well known to be the result of diet deficiency and well known to be curable, yet men died of scurvy anyway.
In part the problem here was corruption in the commissary department, with thieving quartermasters lining their pockets by the private sale of "extras" from the warehouses. That winter, wrote a bitter regimental historian, many a supply officer enriched himself for life. But as much as anything else, the fault was bureaucratic incompetence and indifference. Mounds of requisition forms and miles of red tape smothered the system, and there seemed to be no one with authority enough and regulations enough--and dedication enough--to unsnarl the tangle. Army hospitals, for example, were miserable places to begin with, badly equipped, unsanitary, even unheated because no one had thought to order proper stoves. Patients in them suffered frostbite that winter. "I do not believe I have ever seen greater misery from sickness than exists now in our Army of the Potomac" was how a War Department medical inspector-general summed it up after a January visit to the Rappahannock front.
In harsh fact, the officer corps of the Army of the Potomac, from General Burnside on down, was failing dismally in that most fundamental duty of an officer--to take care of his men. Too many officers, it was observed, were hardly models of good conduct. Indeed, according to a report to the Senate on January 7, no fewer than 411 commissioned officers of the Potomac army were absent without leave. In the opinion of Captain John T. Boyle of the 86th Pennsylvania, "The men have caught the infection from the officers and seem to have lost much of their fire and energy." Brigadier General Carl Schurz, who led a division made up largely of German troops and who wrote regularly to Mr. Lincoln about the state of affairs in the army, was unsparing on this topic. The worst of it was, he told the president, "the spirit of the men is systematically broken by officers high in command." He saw desertions "increasing at a frightful rate." Take all this together, General Schurz warned, "and you will not be surprised when you see this great army melt away with frightful rapidity."
At the other extreme of rank, Private Robert Goodyear of the 27th Connecticut thought the man in the ranks had reached his breaking point. "The soldier of today has a keen perception ...," he wrote. "Abused, humbugged, imposed upon and frequently half-starved and sick, he sees himself made a mere tool for political speculators to operate with. Led on to slaughter and defeat by drunken and incompetent officers, he has become disheartened, discouraged, demoralized.
Abiding proof of the Potomac army's demoralization is in the numbers--the numbers of men deserting from the Rappahannock camps in the weeks after the Battle of Fredericksburg and heading for home. They were deserting at the known risk of severe punishment if caught, up to and including execution by firing squad. They went anyway, and in numbers unprecedented in the army's history.
The Army of the Potomac, to be sure, had always been plagued by the category labeled "absent" on the returns. It was a catchall category, a total of all the men carried on the rolls but not present and accounted for in camp. Some of these men were away from the army legitimately, on furlough or on detached service, such as recruiting duty in their home states. A considerably larger number were the seriously sick and wounded who had been sent north on the sound enough theory that they might recover faster under the care of their homefolks. While these men too were said to be absent by authority, they were out from under direct army control and few of them displayed much eagerness to return to the service. During the Peninsula campaign General McClellan had complained that of the 40,000 listed as absent at least 20,000 were recuperating men "fit for duty" but not back with the army, and that situation had not been resolved in the months since then. The third group in the absent category were the true deserters, the absent without leave, who were not going to return to the army under any circumstances if they could possibly help it.
"I think that if Uncle Sam don't settle this war pretty quick that it will play out for the deserters is a going out by great numbers ...," John E. Ryder of the 24th Michigan wrote home on January 4. It seemed that every letter writer in the army had something to say about this suddenly current topic. Sanford N. Truesdell of the 122nd New York, for example, reported that desertions "are of daily occurrence in almost every Regt. in the field, and sometimes in squads of fifteen or twenty at a time, and they are very rarely brought back." One cause of their going, he thought, was disgust with the Emancipation Proclamation. Charles H. Brewster of the 10th Massachusetts observed that in his division there were two courts-martial operating "in full blast" trying nothing but cases of desertion. "They have apprehended from 2 to 300," he wrote, "and I sincerely hope they will shoot about one half of them." Brewster noted that new regiments containing men who had been paid sizable bounties to enlist "are much the worst in this respect." Bounty-men deserters, he thought, fully deserved the death penalty.
Brigadier General Marsena Patrick, Army of the Potomac provost marshal, was driven to distraction by the rush of deserters. What particularly troubled Patrick was the organization of it. Would-be deserters would arrange to have civilian clothes sent to them from home, then slip out of camp after dark, change into their new garb, and head north with little fear of being identified. On any night any unit on picket duty might find dozens of discarded uniforms in the bushes. The more brazen passed themselves off as Confederate deserters, thereby getting a parole and a free ride out of the army. Late in January a cavalry patrol stumbled on and captured no less than 400 deserters near the supply base at Aquia Landing who were building rafts to ferry themselves across the Potomac to safety in Maryland. Confederate sympathizers operated a sort of underground railroad to provide safe houses for deserters on their way north. One such Southerner, caught in the act, was tried by a military court, sentenced to six months' hard labor, and saw his house burned to the ground. Another "undisguised rebel," a Dr. Stewart, supplied slaves' rough work clothes to deserters before sending them across the Potomac into Maryland.
General Patrick was convinced that one of the factors contributing to the army's demoralization, the late pay or little pay, ironically had a direct connection to the desertion rate. Whenever men did finally get paid, Patrick found, it only encouraged them to desert by providing resources for their escape. He recorded in his diary on January 17 a visit from a Third Corps provost marshal who told him, "The Excelsiors are determined to run if they can get a chance, having been paid off today." The Excelsior Brigade--70th through 74th New York regiments--was one of the better combat outfits in the army. One of the Excelsiors, writing home about this time, insisted "I will never go home on the French leave, but there is a great many leaving in that way." Should more troops be paid off, Patrick predicted "very large desertions & no possibility of staying them."
An order to each regiment and battery to list its absentees and classify them as absent with or without authority produced an unprecedented result. While the overall number of absentees, 85,908, was about the same as the previous November, when Burnside became army commander, the breakdown of the total was very different now. In November the bulk of the men not with the army were the sick and wounded from the severe and continuous fighting of the summer and fall. Now the proportion of sick and wounded had fallen, and the proportion of deserters had risen dramatically. It was found that of the men carried on the rolls of the Army of the Potomac in the field, on the Rappahannock, at the end of January, no fewer than one in ten was a deserter. By report, they "were scattered all over the country," and the rate of desertion had reached 200 a day. The total on January 31 came to 25,363, a veritable corps of deserters. Indeed, this was second only to the Sixth Corps, the largest then with the army.
S. M. Carpenter, a correspondent for the New York Herald, wrote his editor from Falmouth that everywhere he looked he found men de moralized and deserting by scores. "Evil days have befallen us, and no one seems at hand to deliver us. God grant that the Army of the Potomac may not continue to degenerate until its power of resuscitation is wholly lost."
The revolt among his generals helped steel Ambrose Burnside to action, regardless of the consequences, if for no other reason than to face them down. The result has come down in the annals of the Army of the Potomac as the Mud March. The episode seemed proof that ill fortune was the lot of this unhappy commanding general. In the judgment of a regimental surgeon, "The Fates have certainly completed his destruction in the Army."
Alter the president suspended his late December offensive, General Burnside concluded that his plan for crossing the Rappahannock downstream from Fredericksburg was compromised, and determined on another scheme. This time he would cross on the upstream side at Banks's Ford to turn Fredericksburg's defenses from the west, and he would act as quickly as possible. On January 20 he issued an address to the troops. "The commanding general announces to the Army of the Potomac that they are about to meet the enemy once more," it began, and by midday the march upriver was well begun. The way was led by Burnside's two most outspoken detractors, grand-division commanders Franklin and Hooker.
From the moment the march orders were issued Franklin and the Sixth Corps' Baldy Smith opened a litany of complaint. Some of this they registered with Burnside himself, some with anyone who would listen. Colonel Charles S. Wainwright of the artillery visited Franklin's headquarters the day before the movement began and recorded in his diary, "Both his staff and Smith's are talking outrageously, only repeating though, no doubt, the words of their generals.... Franklin has talked so much and so loudly to this effect ever since the present move was decided on, that he has completely demoralized his whole command, and so rendered failure doubly sure.... Smith and they say Hooker are almost as bad." Even during the march this disaffected talk continued, Wainwright noted. "The whole army seems to know what they have said, and their speeches condemning the move were in the mouths of everyone."
On the evening of the first day's march it began to rain, a full-fledged winter nor'easter, coming down hard and cold and windblown, and it continued for more than forty-eight hours. The ground thawed and flooded and the army became quickly and hopelessly stuck in the mud. The infantry might have made some progress if it had gotten off the roads and into the woods, but the wheeled vehicles--the guns and the wagons and the ambulances and especially the hulking pontoon trains for the bridge crossings--were literally stopped in their tracks.
"At dark we went into park," quartermaster Samuel Partridge reported. "The ground was so soft that the wagons settled to the hub, and the mules over the fetlock." In the pontoon trains teams were doubled, then tripled, with in addition as many as 150 infantry manning ropes, but all to little effect. A newspaperman was reminded of a gang of Lilliputians trying to move "huge-ribbed Gulliver." Infantry were also put to work corduroying the roads. George Nichols of the 32nd Massachusetts thought it an endless task: "Each regiment would march off to some fence and make a grand charge on it and then march off each with a rail on his shoulder. We realized that day at least, that we were in the Army of `Honest Abe' the rail splitter."
General Alpheus Williams wrote his daughter afterward, "It is solemnly true that we lost mules in the middle of the road, sinking out of sight in the mud-holes. A few bubbles of air, a stirring of the watery mud, indicated the last expiring efforts of many a poor long-ears." Across the river the Confederates watched and jeered and put up signs taunting the mired Yankees. Colonel George H. Sharpe, soon to become the Potomac army's intelligence chief, noted with professional interest that at least one Rebel sign-painter seemed to have full details on the movement. "Burnside and his pontoons stuck in the mud," his sign read. "Move at I o'clock, 3 days' rations in haversacks."
At last Burnside recognized the futility of it and ordered the troops back to their camps. The return was as difficult as the advance had been. Straggling was heavy, and an uncounted number of men deserted and were never seen again. Guns and wagons and pontoons by the scores had to be left until the roads dried and they could be moved. Veterans of the Army of the Potomac would look back on the Mud March as the nadir of their military experience. Observers at the time wondered if anything could ever be worse. "Burnside rode along yesterday and was followed by hooting and yells," Lieutenant Henry Ropes wrote on January 23. "The troops are in a dreadful state." General Burnside, Ropes thought, "has brought the Army to the verge of mutiny and the country to the worst case it has ever been in."
Traveling with the army during these adventures was Henry J. Raymond, editor of the New York Times, who was appalled by the turmoil in the high command. He learned of the backstairs maneuvering in the officer corps for McClellan's return; of the lack of confidence in Burnside ("because he lacks confidence in himself," one officer said); of Generals Franklin and Smith undercutting their superior at every opportunity. And from the Times's army correspondent William Swinton editor Raymond got an earful of Joe Hooker's broadsides aimed at everyone in sight.
General Hooker, Raymond was told, "has talked very openly about the absurdity of the movement ..., denounced the commanding general as incompetent, and the President and Government at Washington as imbecile and `played out.'" Nothing would go right, so Hooker said, "until we had a dictator, and the sooner the better."
Raymond shared these findings with General Burnside, and by the time he was back at his Falmouth headquarters the general was seething. Even before the Mud March, he told Raymond, he had considered relieving Franklin and Smith; only the need to keep the movement on schedule stayed his hand. Now he was free to act, and he determined to crush the revolt of the generals with one blow. General Order No. 8, "By command of Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside," dated January 23, was an extraordinary document.
Heading Burnside's list of targets was Joe Hooker, whom he ordered dismissed from the service for (among other things) "having been guilty of unjust and unnecessary criticisms of the actions of his superior officers." Also dismissed was Brigadier General William T. H. Brooks, one of Baldy Smith's division commanders, whom Burnside had put in arrest earlier in the month for insubordination.
By this time Burnside had learned the identity of the two talebearers who visited the president on December 30, and Generals John Newton and John Cochrane were also dismissed from the service. William Franklin and Baldy Smith and Colonel J. H. Taylor, of Franklin's staff, being "of no further service to this army," were relieved of their commands and ordered to Washington for reassignment. By now thrashing about in all directions, Burnside relieved two lesser officers, an action he later admitted was done in error.
As soon as the order was drawn up, Burnside showed it to the Times's Raymond and to his medical officer, Dr. William H. Church. While Raymond applauded the document, especially its condemnation of Hooker, he wondered if that general might be tempted to raise the troops of his command in mutiny against his dismissal. Let Hooker try it, Burnside said grimly, and he would "swing him before sundown." He was ready to issue General Order No. 8 on the spot until Dr. Church reminded him that such major command changes could not take effect without President Lincoln's approval. Burnside promptly telegraphed the president that he was coming up to Washington with "some very important orders, and I want to see you before issuing them."
Newspapers reaching the Union camps on the Rappahannock just at this time carried a front-page story of sobering interest to the dissident generals. Reading between the lines, it was evident that the army administration in Washington and President Lincoln had (so to speak) fired a warning shot across the bows of the officer corps of the Army of the Potomac. The papers announced that on January 21, while the army was wallowing through the Mud March, the president had approved the verdict of a general court-martial sitting in Washington that found Major General Fitz John Porter guilty as charged and cashiering him from the army.
The Porter court-martial had carried with it the odor of notoriety from the moment it convened on December 3, 1862. General Porter was charged with failure to obey lawful orders and with misbehavior before the enemy at the Second Battle of Manassas, fought in late August, during which he commanded the Fifth Corps. The Federals were beaten and Porter was accused of being the primary cause of it. He was also on trial for something more shadowy than that. Fitz John Porter had been George McClellan's virtual alter ego throughout that general's time of command. Consequently, he was whispered to be the virtual personification of McClellanism, the taint now said to be infecting the Army of the Potomac.
As the Porter court-martial progressed, through December and into January, evidence of that taint seemed to grow plainer day by day. There was the report of failings at the Battle of Fredericksburg by McClellan disciple William Franklin; the well-publicized generals' revolt against Burnside; the widespread demoralization within the army; the cries for McClellan's restoration. The nine-member court sitting in judgment of Porter was hardly blind to such signals. The makeup of the court was the work of Secretary of War Stanton and was suspect; Porter complained that he would need "proof strong as holy writ" to win his case. After the judges' verdict but before it was announced, Porter wrote to General McClellan, "the court began to smell your return to power and were influenced by it in their decision." It was a prophetic analysis.
Whatever the merits of the specific charges against General Porter--his cashiering would be reversed, after a rehearing, twenty-three years later--he was silently declared guilty of another military crime. On the day the verdict was announced, the Potomac army's Captain Charles Russell Lowell recognized the deeper significance of the case. Porter's frame of mind was un-officer-like and dangerous," Lowell wrote. "This sort of feeling was growing in the army, and the Government and the Country felt that it must be stopped. Porter was made the example." Mr. Lincoln, by approving the Porter verdict, underlined its message: any officer of the Army of the Potomac who dared to direct his loyalty elsewhere than to the general commanding did so at his peril.
On January 23, in Falmouth, Generals Franklin and Smith lunched with the commanding general. Baldy Smith recalled with pleasure the fare being a boned turkey that someone in Rhode Island had sent the general. Burnside seemed "very variable in spirits--at times almost gay and then relapsing into moodiness," and Smith was particularly struck by one remark. "You will presently hear of something that will astonish you all," Burnside promised. He offered the conspirators no further hint of the fate he had planned for them.
The next morning Burnside reached the White House and presented the president with an unhappy choice. He handed him General Order No. 8 and with it his resignation of his major general's commission. He said he did not want to embarrass the president, or to stand in opposition to him, but a choice must be made. The only way he could continue in command of the Army of the Potomac would be without the officers named in the order. The president must either endorse General Order No. 8 or accept his resignation. As he had done at their earlier meeting when Burnside first offered to resign, Lincoln said he would consider the matter and speak with his advisers, and asked Burnside to return the next day.
That Saturday evening President and Mrs. Lincoln held a reception at the White House, which a newspaper reported was "unusually well attended." Among the guests was Henry Raymond, the New York Times editor, who buttonholed the president to report on his recent visit to the army. Raymond was at particular pains to relay Times correspondent Swinton's conversation with Joe Hooker. He quoted Hooker's unsparing comments on Burnside and on the administration and on Mr. Lincoln himself, as well as his view that what the country needed was a dictator and the sooner the better. The president put his hand on Raymond's shoulder and spoke in his ear, so as not to be overheard: "That is all true--Hooker does talk badly; but the trouble is, he is stronger with the country to-day than any other man."
On Sunday morning, January 25, when the president called Secretary Stanton and General Halleck to his office at 10 o'clock, it was not in fact to seek their advice about the command of the Army of the Potomac. Ml: Lincoln had already decided that question without any need for discussion, as had become his habit when making command changes in this army. At the time, and later, much would be said about who participated in this command decision and what was said and what candidates were put forth, but the truth of the matter is that Mr. Lincoln took the decision himself, without counsel and advice. He simply announced to Stanton and Halleck the choice General Burnside had presented him, and said that he was relieving Burnside and giving the command of the Army of the Potomac to Major General Joseph Hooker.
Burnside was called in and told of the decision. He was not surprised and most probably felt relief; it seemed to him the best solution to what had become an intractable problem. He pledged to the president "that neither he nor General Hooker would be a happier man than I would be if General Hooker could gain a victory...." He was persuaded not to resign his commission but instead to take a thirty-day leave. (In time Burnside would be assigned to the western theater, in command of the Army of the Ohio.)
The generals' revolt could claim success in its primary purpose, the overthrow of Ambrose Burnside. Without its conspiratorial efforts the Army of the Potomac would almost certainly have fought a second battle, at the turn of the year, along the Rappahannock. In that event perhaps General Burnside might have retrieved his reputation and restored spirit to his army. Or, on the contrary, the consequence might have been the destruction of his army, as General Newton predicted. However that may be, the Franklin-Smith cabal was sorely disappointed that for all its efforts it did not end up with the commanding general of its choice.
In due course every member of the cabal would have reason to regret his participation. John Newton would be transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the western theater the next year and would end the war at a backwater posting in the Florida Keys. John Cochrane resigned his commission within the month, citing his health, and returned to the New York political wars. William Franklin was severed from the Army of the Potomac the same day Hooker was appointed to command it. He afterward served in the West with steadily diminishing results and spent most of the last year of the war "awaiting orders." Baldy Smith, too, would be exiled from the Army of the Potomac, and in March saw his major general's commission expire in the Senate. After service in the western theater he returned to the Potomac army, but, like Franklin, he ended the war "awaiting orders." Smith spoke for his fellow conspirators when he wrote, of their efforts that winter, "the results followed me through the war."
Mr. Lincoln, on this twenty-fifth of January 1863, having determined that just then Joe Hooker was stronger with the country than any other of his generals, had to hope that he was the right general to command this shaken army. For all his failings, General McClellan had been right about one thing. The Army of the Potomac was indeed the Union's shield, and right now it desperately needed its demoralization reversed and its confidence restored.
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